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Abstract
Bushnell, Jonpaul. MA. The University of Memphis. August, 2013. Gandhi,
Lenin, and the Politics of Friendship. Major Professor: Dr. Sharon Stanley.
This project presents a comparison between the revolutionary projects of
Mohandas Gandhi and Vladimir Lenin on the basis of the concept of friendship.
Friendship provides an intriguing, albeit elusive means of comprehending revolutionary
politics because it comprises a social relationship outside the bounds of laws.
Furthermore, friendship expresses the possibility of mutual loyalty and dedication which
is not only unlegislatable, but which can challenge loyalties to the existing regime.
However, friendship can also introduce new standards of exclusion and domination into
politics, particularly when a political project requires a distinction between “authentic”
and “inauthentic” forms of friendship. As a result, this comparison between two vastly
different political visions, by exploring their implications for the concept of friendship,
can reveal tensions common to both which center upon their need to simultaneously
disqualify one form of power while legitimizing another.

iii

Chapter 1: Gandhi, Lenin and the Politics of Friendship
Despite their antithetical positions towards violence, religion, and the proper
conduct of political action, the figures of Mohandas Gandhi and Vladimir Lenin present
an intriguing comparative case for the study of twentieth century revolutionary politics.
Both appeared to their supporters to be surrounded by an irresistible mystique and were
(in)famous for rejecting the ordinary channels of political action conventionally centered
upon the nation-state, appearing to instead embody radical new horizons for political
action liberated from the “illusions” of capitalism. Beyond whatever individual merits
either man may have possessed, however, their historical identities have been intimately
interwoven within the historical crises of the twentieth century through which each was
socialized into a political world and in which both men obtained symbolic significance
for audiences both at home and abroad as shapers of and ciphers for a global struggle
against imperial hegemony. Given the strange admixture of ardent utopianism and sober
pragmatism which has characterized many mainstream readings of both figures, a
comparison between these two figures may prove useful for excavating wider tendencies
within contemporary politics which are often dissimulated within and evacuated from
mainstream politics onto the constructed face of a radical Other (communist
revolutionary, religious fundamentalist, etc.)
To this end, the present comparison will attempt to establish a political framework
between these two thinkers on the basis of friendship; the concept of friendship should
tender apt terrain for such a comparison because friendship itself occupies an ambivalent
but ineluctable relationship to politics. Although friendship appears to be a marginal topic
in comparison to state-making, finance, warfare, and the other pillars of “high politics,” it
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is nevertheless ubiquitous to politics, both in its relationship to various conceptions of
citizenship, cooperation, and sociality in general, as well as in its ambiguous but crucially
determining role in the distinction between “allies” and “enemies.” The relatively
marginal status of friendship within political critique allows these thinkers to be
approached from an angle more likely to catch both their texts and their critics at
unawares, shedding new light on otherwise familiar themes and uncovering unexpected
points of comparison. In addition, the theme of friendship as both a model of citizenship
and a possible alternative to it has significant implications for both figures insofar as they
each reject the state as the highest source of obligation in politics while seeking to both
theorize and bring forth new forms of social belonging.
Even as early as 1927, almost a generation prior to the conclusion of the Second
World War and the subsequent onset of decolonization, these two figures found
themselves within a curious comparative treatment by René Fülöp-Miller (1972), whose
analysis appears to follow Ezra Pound’s poetic contention that “the age demanded an
image of its accelerated grimace,” finding just such an image in these two figures of
radical discontent and resistance. In the introduction to his work Lenin and Gandhi,
Fülöp-Miller writes that the two men’s personalities “most forcibly embody the spirit of
the present age,” and that despite their manifest intellectual antagonisms, “the deep
kinship and the common spiritual origin of the two may be seen at every turn, often more
clearly in the differences between them than in the obvious resemblances in their lives.”1
Clearly, Fülöp-Miller’s comparison subscribes to a theory of “great men”
heroically fashioning history while simultaneously embodying the spirit and
1
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contradictions of an entire “age.” Contradicting Lenin’s own understanding of himself
and the historical process, a worldview informed primarily by Marx’s historical
materialism, Fülöp-Miller writes that “Bolshevism is entirely the achievement of Lenin,
understandable only through him and possible only through him.”2 He questions why
Lenin and his compatriots were capable of achieving such drastic results using the same
ideas and rhetoric which Marxists across the European continent had been deploying for
decades, concluding that the results could only be explained by Lenin’s electrifying
personality. To buttress this claim Fülöp-Miller includes frequent testimony from Lenin’s
Marxist compatriots, such as Trotsky’s woeful declaration that “When we think that
Lenin may die, our whole life seems useless and we cease to want to live,” or Zinov’ev’s
contention that nine-tenths of it was the work of Lenin, if in revolutionary times one may
speak of a single personality at all.”3
Of course, such an approach is surely liable to distort the complex amalgam of
ideas and relationships involved in such processes by compressing an author such as
Trotsky’s entire oeuvre into a single quote, perhaps made in a moment of doubt.
Elsewhere, Trotsky (2006) had mocked the idea that “history resolves itself into an
endless sheet of paper,”4 insisting instead that history was the effect of concrete actions
conditioned by the dynamics of production and the circulation of goods; his most
compelling explanation of the Russian Revolution was not one centered upon Lenin’s
“greatness” but rather an argument for “uneven development.” He writes,
2
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The laws of history have nothing in common with a pedantic schematism.
Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most
sharply and complexly in the destiny of the backward countries. Under the whip
of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the
universal law of unevenness thus derives another law of combined development
by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a
combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary
forms.5
In a similar fashion, Lenin (1975) argues that the First World War was an
imperialist war, conditioned not by discrete policy choices made by European statesmen,
a position Lenin attributes to the ever-reviled Bolshevik nemesis Karl Kautsky, but rather
to the resultant pressures of capitalism’s expansion and consolidation in the twentieth
century. This change in the dynamics of capitalism, Lenin claims, meant that “certain of
its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites,” one example being
the displacement of competition by monopolies due to the increasingly vast entry costs of
major industries such as railway production, the expansion of indirect ownership through
subsidiaries, and the convergence of ownership between major financial institutions and
industrial enterprises.6 Such historical accounts manifestly contradict Fülöp-Miller’s
account of Bolshevism’s self-understanding, yet the argument for Lenin’s
indispensability for the Russian Revolution’s success is not so easily surmounted.
Fülöp-Miller’s (1972) account of the reverential demeanor held by Lenin’s
supporters is corroborated by Robert Tucker (1975), who notes that even theoretical
opponents of Lenin, such as Valentinov and the Menshevik leader Potresov readily
testified to Lenin’s indefatigable force of personality. Tucker himself claims that Lenin’s
5
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“essential contribution was to nerve the Bolsheviks into making their decisive
revolutionary move when the time came,” and he notes that Trotsky had written in his
diary, ostensibly against his own materialist Weltanschauung, that the October
Revolution would not have occurred without Lenin because the other party leaders would
not have been pushed towards the crucial decisions of that year without his involvement.7
This conundrum for Marxist analysis of the Russian Revolution helps to underscore the
multiplicity of viewpoints cohabiting even within individual theorists, as well as to
indicate the importance of situating both actors and theorists within a contextual
framework which is itself protean and often contradictory.
Fülöp-Miller’s (1972) presentation of Gandhi proves more patronizing even than
his study of Lenin. His predilection for anecdote and autobiography dominates his entire
conception of Gandhi’s politics, and the effectiveness of Gandhian nonviolence is
neutralized and rendered admirable from afar as an exotic innovation of an alien culture.
“He is no orator,” Fülöp-Miller writes, “yet a whole nation blindly obeys his word.
However excited the rabble may be, Gandhi can calm them with a single word.”8
Nowhere is Gandhi shown to exercise any actual political acumen, and the Indian
population, or “rabble,” as Fülöp-Miller frequently presents them, appear to be nothing
more than superstitious, childlike followers with little to no political agency. The
peculiarities of Gandhi’s lifestyle, such as his adoption of homespun clothing, his vow of
chastity, and his rejection of “Western” medicine are taken at face value and presented as
central features of Gandhi’s “authentic” sainthood.
7
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Discussing Gandhi’s ashrams, religious communities akin to monasteries, FülöpMiller understands these collectives as purely religious institutions, ignoring the complex
socio-political considerations interwoven with them. Ajay Skaria (2002) notes that
ashrams were long used in India to direct the movement through various stages of life,
and that they had initially acquired political value during the Bengali Renaissance as a
means to reconnect with and cultivate Hindu nationalism. Gandhi’s innovation involved
the politicization of the ashram vows themselves in order to neutralize the embodied
practices acquired through colonial discipline and to replace these practices with a
discipline of spontaneous resistance.9 Rather than interpreting such features of Gandhi’s
political life uncritically as straightforward expressions of religiosity, Skaria’s
understanding of the ashram as a politicization of an older form of life to meet and
counter colonial discipline with revolutionary discipline demonstrates greater complexity
within Gandhi’s thought and is of far greater use to understanding Gandhi’s politics than
Fülöp-Miller incessant hagiography.
These omissions are indicative of a generally chauvinistic attitude which FülöpMiller (1972) displays towards his subject-matter, thinly concealed beneath a veneer of
veneration. He describes the regime headed by Lenin as “a cross between Asiatic
indolence and lethargy and extreme Americanism,” and he insists that “the figure of the
modern cosmopolitan professional politician imported from Europe is alien to the nature
of India,” a country for whom “the ‘holy man’ is the only possible form of national
politician.”10 In his introduction, Fülöp-Miller claims that these two men “are both
9

Skaria, Ajay. Liberalism and the Question of Ashram, pp. 956-957.

10

Fülöp-Miller, René. Lenin and Gandhi, pp. 120, 304, 306.

6

animated by the same spirit of indictment of European culture,” an indictment which he
insists that “Europe” shall overcome through its “rich and manifold culture based on the
freedom of personality,’ further adding that “the West has hitherto known how to
transform all great ideas coming from the East into a new and organic enrichment of its
own nature.”11
So, why read Fülöp-Miller’s Lenin and Gandhi if it measures so poorly against its
subject-matter? What this text lacks in insight is compensated by its temporal proximity
to its subjects, coupled with its use of primary sources to support its fallacious arguments.
As a result, the text provides a useful, although by no means exhaustive, insight into the
intellectual climate in which both Lenin and Gandhi emerged. Furthermore, where the
text purports to constitutes itself upon a division between “the West” and its
revolutionary counterparts in Russia and India, the characters which unfold within its
arguments seem to be intimately related to Eurocentric crises of political legitimacy and
religious disillusionment, indicating that the points where Fülöp-Miller is most eager to
differentiate his subjects from his audience are precisely where his argument is closest to
home. Wendy Brown (2006) identifies a similar process within liberal discourses of
tolerance, which arrange the objects of tolerance at a respectful distance from “pure”
liberal society in order to conceal its being “always already being the issue of
miscegenation with its fundamentalist Other, as containing this Other within, and thus
having a certain potential for recognizing and connecting with this Other without.”12 As a
result, Fülöp-Miller’s comparison indirectly indicates that such a comparison can
11
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potentially shed light upon shared practices, assumptions, and anxieties within a variety
of erstwhile incommunicable political positions.
Laying Out the Field of Comparison
Although Fülöp-Miller demonstrates some of the potential pitfalls which a
comparison between these two figures may fall into, an alternative to Fülöp-Miller’s
“great man” approach is required. Such an alternative can be found within Michel
Foucault’s (1984) conception of the author-function, which describes how names like
“Lenin” and “Gandhi” circulate within an economy of power and prohibition, denoting
the historiographical, subversive, and disciplinary elements of authorship itself. However,
the problem remains that both figures were activists as well as writers, and their
individuation and exceptional authority within their respective places and times, as
historical constructs, demands a brief engagement with Theda Skocpol’s (1979) work.
Without fully endorsing Skocpol’s position, her work may nonetheless provide a limitcase for testing the viability of the “author-function” conception; if it remains tenable
even within Skocpol’s framework, then it will likely prove fruitful under less austere
conditions. Finally, Max Weber’s (1999) sociological analysis of the “charismatic
politician” will be used to justify the expansion of the authorship concept into the lived
activity of these two figures.
Skocpol (1979) conveniently begins States and Social Revolution by providing a
succinct, if possibly redundant definition of social revolutions as “the combination of two
coincidences; the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the
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coincidence of political with social transformation.”13 Skocpol claims that Marxism’s
analysis of class conflict rooted within ownership of productive property and the
accumulation and distribution of surplus wealth is “indispensible” but that it must be
supplemented by other modes of inquiry which explore how class member come to be
able to resist or exert authority. To this end she proposes “a nonvoluntarist, structural
perspective,” excluding emphases upon “class consciousness” and other voluntarist
concepts for translating material conditions into revolutionary action. She justifies this
exclusion by claiming that these concepts risk smuggling ideals of majority consent into
political analysis when researchers should instead be “rising above the viewpoints of
participants to find important regularities across given historical instances.”14
Departing from both Marxist and liberal conceptions of the state and society,
Skocpol argues that states are neither pure instruments of the ruling class nor neutral
guarantors of rights and contracts, but that states compete with each other within an
international system and exercise some degree of autonomy in pursuing their interests. 15
Hence, she rejects the conception of the state as a neutral arena for the play of social
forces, insisting that the state itself comprises a significant structure within the dynamics
of revolutionary change. While it may appear odd that Skocpol discerns agency within an
abstract entity such as the state while denying the relevance of the individual agents
which comprise the state, she does not reject the possibility of meaningful individual
activism per se but instead notes that such agency emerges in chaotic, unexpected
13
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fashions and is therefore of little use for sophisticated, comparative analysis. More
telling, however, is the quote from Eric Hobsbawm she includes: ‘the evident importance
of actors in the drama…does not mean that they are also dramatist, producer, and stagedesigner.”16 Even without agents, it appears that Skocpol’s revolutions still require
authors.
The status of the author itself has been the subject of extensive critique within a
variety of academic disciplines, and Michel Foucault’s (1984) seminal essay What Is an
Author? addresses the problem of the author’s “death” in contemporary criticism, as well
as the author’s lingering metaphysical presence guised in the concept of “writing.” When
critics mention the “death of the author,” they are generally referring to a method of
textual analysis which rejects original, authorial intent as a valid basis for criticism and
instead seeks to interpret the “work” in question through its own internal structures of
style and reference, as well as its intersections with other texts which allow such texts to
be organized and arranged according to taxonomic principles such as “genre.” However,
Foucault warns that “A certain number of notions intended to replace the privileged
position of the author actually seem to preserve that privilege and suppress the real
meaning of his disappearance.”17
In place of the individual, this form of criticism instead places priority upon the
“work,” which is marked with the author’s proper name. Summarizing this distinction,
Foucault writes “the links between the proper name and the individual named and
16
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between the author’s name and what it names are not isomorphic and do not function in
the same way.”18 Rather than attempting to understand what the individuals labeled
“Gandhi” and “Lenin” may have actually intended at one point or another, a critic
working within this tradition would instead scour the written materials classified under
these respective monikers in order to find internal points of comparison between style,
subject-matter, background texts, and so forth in order to situate the two “works” with
respect to each other.
A new problem here arises, however, when the limits of the work must be
demarcated. Do scribbles left in the margins of a draft constitute a portion of a work?
What is the threshold for relevancy? Who decides? How are we to decide which elements
to include “amid the millions of traces left by someone after his death?”19 Rather than
conceiving of the work as the object which careful criticism must uncover, Foucault
argues that the work itself plays a regulating function in the organization of texts,
establishing standards of stylistic consistency, thematic homogeneity, and conditions of
acceptable interpretation.20 This type of mechanism, which Foucault labels an “authorfunction,” does not operate at all levels of language but instead denotes the status of
certain types of discourse while simultaneously disciplining possible modes of expression
or interpretation within these discourses. Tracing the historical genealogy of this peculiar
mode of discipline, Foucault suggests that the emergence of the authorial figure within
European societies was linked to ability to identify and punish heretics, rebels, and other
18
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dissident speakers and writers, as well as the proliferation and rationalization of property
rights.21
Perhaps Foucault’s most significant observation regarding the author-function is
that it does not develop spontaneously but is instead a psychologizing projection of a
complete, rational, subjective design onto a given series of texts. To be sure, he does not
conceive of the text to be inert material passively assembled by the author function; he
notes that certain signs within a text can already point to an author, such as personal
pronouns or verb conjugations, but that these elements operate differently within
discourses regulated by author-functions than they do in those discourses of everyday
speech which lack authorial presence. Whereas the “I” of everyday speech has a fairly
clear reference-point, the “I” of a novel, or a philosophical treatise, or poem plays a far
more elusive and variable role.22 Thus, even in the most intimate forms of authored text,
such as autobiography or political manifesto, to use examples drawn from Gandhi and
Lenin, the intimacy and passion of the texts themselves rests upon forgetting an authorfunction which is itself constituted to be forgotten so that a “direct” communication
between the authorial individual and the reader can take place. Such textual mechanisms
can help to explain the circulation of political discourses and their associations with
individuals, clarifying the comparison between Gandhi and Lenin and demonstrating its
viability even within a socio-structural framework such as Skocpol (1979); however,
Foucault (1984) is careful to warn his readers:

21
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the author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning…the ideological
figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of
meaning...the regulator of the fictive, a role quite characteristic of our era of
industrial and bourgeois society, of individualism and private property.23
The case of authors such as Lenin and Gandhi presents a particularly challenging
instance for the explication of such a function because both were primarily political
activists, rather than theorists. They each wrote prolifically, to be sure, but their collected
works are composed mainly of letters, manifestos, and other brief writings infused with
urgency which were addressed almost exclusively to elucidating the practical challenges
of their respective movements. The position which each occupied was situated
somewhere between the roles of critic and professional politician, a position which must
surely distinguish the functioning of their authorial identities from authors more easily
able to separate their published identities from their private lives. As a result, any analysis
of these figures must account for this dual role, and for this we turn to Max Weber’s
(1999) analysis of political authority, which will indicate the possibility of integrating
both figures’ public personas with their authorial identities, as well as foreshadowing the
manner in which a certain formulation of “the friend” as an idealized alter-ego of the self
informs the political effectiveness of these figures.
Both Lenin and Gandhi provide exemplary demonstrations of what Max Weber
referred to as the “charismatic politician.” In a lecture entitled Politics as a Vocation
Weber describes three forms of political authority: the authority of tradition the authority
of rational legality, and the authority of charismatic leadership. The charismatic leader,
Weber argues, “has emerged in all places and in all historical epochs. Most importantly in
the past, it has emerged in the two figures of the magician and the prophet on the one
23
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hand, and in the elected warlord, the gang leader, and condotierre on the other.”24 Such a
leader typically lives “for politics,” passionately striving after a cause, rather than living
“off politics,” viewing politics a livelihood, although the two are not mutually exclusive.
Weber argues that such figures, as well as politicians in general, are typically drawn from
“dispensable” occupations, those which are not directly and intensely involved in the
production and circulation of goods, implying that neither the entrepreneurial class nor
the proletariat could be strictly considered to be political classes because each must make
available the majority of its time for the reproduction of economic life.25
Although Lenin (1975) challenges this premise by asserting that twentieth century
capitalism has shifted the majority of “brain work” away from the domain of the owners
and into the realm of the workers,26 it is nevertheless significant that that both he and
Gandhi were trained lawyers, the segment of society which Weber (1999) considers best
suited to professional politics, and that he himself identified his occupation in a party
survey as “writer.”27 Because the lawyer’s craft is to plead effectively for her clients
regardless of circumstances, lawyers are well-suited to the deployment of partisan
strategy necessary for political action. However, what distinguishes the charismatic
politician from her peers is that she will “take a stand.”28
24

Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation, pp. 79-80.

25

Ibid, p. 85.

26

Lenin, Vladimir. Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism, from The
Lenin Anthology, ed. Robert Tucker, p. 216.
27

Tucker, Robert. The Lenin Anthology, p. L

28

Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation, p. 95.

14

Herein lies the greatest danger for such figures, that they are driven by an
unquenchable passion which must nevertheless be tempered by the realities of politics.
The essence of politics, Weber argues, is organized violence, and anyone who would
enter the political realm for reasons other than vanity or avarice must retain a sober
respect for this iron law. Weber distinguishes between an “ethic of ultimate ends,” which
strives for perfection of intent, and an “ethic of responsibility:” the recognition that a
politician cannot honestly hide behind good intentions or anonymity when the violent
repercussions of politics become apparent.29
Although Weber’s description of politics appears to disqualify Gandhi as an
effective, responsible politician, Karuna Mantena (2012) has argued that Gandhi’s
politics of nonviolent resistance are not only compatible with realism but provide a much
needed qualification of its political worldview. Mantena notes that Gandhi shares the
realist belief that violence is endemic to politics and fashions his form of political
activism around engaging with and diffusing violence. By accepting that violence is the
constituting element of politics, Gandhi can argue that any violence, even if justified by
the noblest ends, can quickly devolve into a never-ending spiral of retribution and
paranoia.30 At least with respect to Weber’s (1999) assertion that the responsible
politician must take account of the “average deficiencies of people,” Gandhi appears to fit
the mold of Weber’s responsible politician.31
29
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Similarly, despite Lenin’s reputation as an unyielding radical, several of his
decisions reflect the measured ethos of responsibility which Weber extols. The success of
the Bolshevik Revolution depended in large part upon ending the war with Germany, and
Lenin’s decision to accept the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, despite its humiliating terms, may
have made all the difference between the Bolsheviks’ success and the earlier provisional
government’s failure, despite the accusations of cowardice leveled at him by his more
bellicose compatriots. Similarly, the ardent socialist Lenin was accused of betraying
socialist principles when he ended the policies of compulsory communism in order to
finance the war with the counter-revolutionary armies.32
Although neither figure may fully have embodied Weber’s (1999) ideal of the
responsible politician, they each nonetheless demonstrated many of her ascribed
characteristics. Near the conclusion of his lecture, Weber introduces the character of the
“mature man,” a politician poised perilously upon the threshold between the impossible
and the unconscionable. Weighing the implications of his situation and completely aware
of his responsibility for what befalls, this man nevertheless reaches the point where he
says, “Here I stand; I can do no other.”33
Of course, the question remains whether any individual can actually bear the
responsibility for such a momentous decision, particularly when its effects are distributed
amongst others, and the heroic quality of this politician recalls an earlier argument by
Weber which both reveals a profound tension within his thought and brings us back
around to the concept of friendship. The “decisive psychological quality of the
32
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politician,” he says, is “his ability to let realities work upon him with inner concentration
and calmness. Hence his distance to things and men. ‘Lack of distance’ per se is one of
the deadly sins of every politician.”34 A politician must not be swayed to rashness by
external events, yet this very distance would appear to preclude the possibility of
responsibility in the Weberian sense; he cannot simultaneously withdraw himself from
events, yet claim to bear any meaningful responsibility for their outcome. Furthermore,
this necessary distance between a politician and his constituents produces a particularly
intriguing effect with the charismatic politician, whose authority is derived from his force
of personality within society and who appeals to his followers as an idealized form of
themselves.
Friendship: Some Introductory Remarks
Given both figures’ emphasis upon political practice and their opposition to the
existing structures of law, government, and citizenship, the concept of friendship
provides several fruitful analytical instruments for their comparison. Democratic theorist
Danielle Allen (2006) has argued that friendship provides crucial training for effective
political action; her understanding of friendship is largely informed by Aristotle’s
definitions in the Nicomachean Ethics. Here, Aristotle defines friendship as a relation of
love and distinguishes between three major types of friendship, using the object of love
as the basis for these distinctions. The two most common types are friendships of
pleasure and friendships of utility; in pleasure friendships the loved object is the

34
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amusement, relaxation, or self-esteem obtained from the friendship, whereas in utility
friendships it is the service or use provided by the friend which is loved.35
Furthermore, Aristotle maintains that these types of friendship are possible
without the equality of justice, which is based in merit, because friendship replaces this
standard with its own, the equality of quantity, each friend receiving a share based upon
his status as friend, rather than according to desert. Within such friendships the
appearance of equality is crucial for maintaining this type of equality because the friends
involved may have no way of irrefutably knowing which one is actually contributing
more to the friendship. Because of their limited nature, these types of friendship demand
little of their participants other than being skilled in rendering and receiving pleasure and
use with others, and they can be maintained with numerous individuals at once.36
However, these common types of friendship are also capricious and ephemeral,
resting upon motives which may soon fade once satisfied. By contrast, Aristotle argues
that perfect friendship, in which the object of love is simply the other for his own sake, is
both rare and permanent, driven simply by a mutual appreciation of the other’s goodness.
Such friendships, he argues, are inherently rare because they require extraordinary virtue
as well as time, to ensure that each’s appreciation is authentic, rather than mere
appearance, but these perfect friendships also represent the perfection of justice, since
such friends maintain a just relationship without external enforcement.37
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Although Allen uses Aristotle’s basic schema of friendship, she attempts to
diffuse the inherent hierarchies which it reaffirms; she argues that utility friendship best
captures the disparate elements of democratic citizenship and that such friendships can
inculcate political habits directly applicable in the public sphere. The impermanence of
such friendships she views as a virtue because they must be continually maintained as
works in progress rather than allowing themselves to fossilize based upon past
experience.38 She argues that utility friendships require their participants to moderate
themselves in order to maintain the relationship, inculcating a sense of reciprocity and
allowance rather than rigid legalism; the person who always asserts his full legal
entitlements may alienate others, whereas the willingness to take less than one is owed is
crucial for the self-regulation of friendship.39
Such habits of moderated self-interest are impossible to legislate, yet Allen argues
that they are crucial for the stability of democratic regimes. She notes that no political
decision can possibly occur without some members of the community giving up more
than others, and for this reason, democracy can only function if citizens trust that the
burdens are distributed equitably over time. The existence of entrenched, rather than
fluid, minorities within a society, she insists, indicates that some members’ sacrifices are
not being recognized or reciprocated and that a society’s habits of citizenship are
deficient. By contrast, she argues that a careful cultivation of the habits of friendship,
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even the fleeting, conditional variants of friendship, can produce the key virtue of
sociality, “excellence precisely at living together with strangers.”40
The political possibilities of Aristotle’s perfect friendship appear limited with
respect to the avenues indicated by Allen; its rarity and self-sufficiency do not lend
themselves readily to the political realm, where the habits of negotiation and compromise
and the conditionality of trust involved with utility friendship appear to have more utility.
However, an anecdote related by Montaigne in his own meditation upon friendship
indicates a significant parallel between this ideal of perfect friendship and the
revolutionary ideals of figures such as Gandhi and Lenin. Montaigne recalls a period after
the death of the Roman consul Tiberius Gracchus, when his suspected friends and
associates were being hunted and prosecuted, and describes the interrogation of
Gracchus’ friend Caius Blossius. Blossius was asked whether he would have set fire to
the temples had Gracchus ordered it. After replying that his friend would never have
asked such a thing, he was pressured to admit that if Gracchus had asked it of him, he
would have assented.41
This hypothetical consent to a dead friend’s request adds a curious spin to the
Aristotelian suggestion that good lawgivers promote friendship above justice. Not far
from Blossius’ frank statement of priority between his loyalties lies the image of
revolutionary friends (dare we say friends of the revolution?) forging a new community
from within. Might the slogan “liberty, equality, fraternity” carry with a dream of
shattering the paternal covenant of tradition and establishing in its place a new order of
40
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universal perfect friendship between?42 However, this desire to inaugurate friendship
within a new law will be revealed to be precisely the point at which both revolutionary
projects seek authorization from the very systems of power which they rise against.
Review of the Chapters
These brief reflections upon friendship will be expanded and applied to the
political projects of Mohandas Gandhi and Vladimir Lenin in the subsequent chapters.
Besides the role of friendship in cultivating political agency and the relationship between
idealized friendship and both revolution and fraternity, these chapters will also address
the relationship between friendship and identity, as well as the inverse of friendship,
enmity, as it has been theorized by Carl Schmitt and as it applies to both Gandhi and
Lenin.
The second chapter will consider the relationship between Gandhi’s politicization
of ascetic practice and his approach towards friendship. It will argue that Gandhi’s
reading of the Bhagavad Gita inaugurates an approach to friendship which eschews
intimacy in favor of universalizability, while noting Gandhi’s use of a discourse of
tolerance to disarm the contradictions between such universal friendship and the
particularities and dangers of political struggle.
In the third chapter, Lenin’s use of the concept of class struggle as a basis for
friendship will be analyzed, along with the paternalistic implications of the vanguard
party within his thought. The possibility of a dialectical reading of friendship will be
explored, and the problem of enmity as the organizing affect of politics, as suggested by
Carl Schmitt, will be introduced as a limitation to Lenin’s thought.
42
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The final chapter shall explore this relationship between Schmitt’s thought and
these two projects in greater detail, presenting the problem of friendship for politics as
one of exceptional circumstances before the law. It shall argue that the common thread
between Schmitt and these projects lies in an attempt to neutralize, rather than confront,
the problem of the exception, and will counter this approach with one drawn from Walter
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence.
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Chapter 2: Gandhi’s Politics of Ascetic Friendship
The position of nonviolent non-cooperation espoused by Mohandas Gandhi
presents a portrait of agonistic, universal friendship in which the political enemy is to be
converted, rather than destroyed. Furthermore, this form of “friendly” struggle could be
employed against allies, as well as opponents, offering a manner of practice in which
friendship would neither be incompatible with political disagreement nor would it
prevent such disagreements from being acted upon. The success of this non-cooperation
program, however, ironically depended upon the cooperation of millions of Indians, and
Gandhi’s political persona of “Mahatma” may indicate a useful starting point for
unpacking this widespread cooperation, its sources, and its implications; translating as
“great soul,” this title indicates that Gandhi’s public effectiveness was predicated upon
perceptions of his personal virtue. Hence, when Gandhi launched a personal hunger strike
in 1932 to protest the segregation of Dalit (commonly known in the West as
“Untouchables”) candidates and voters from the rest of the Indian electorate, not only
was he able to achieve his desired compromise, but the means of his power were
themselves further augmented.1
The sense of Gandhi as a man of saintly virtue, a prior necessity for the strike to
be an effective tactic and for Gandhi’s individual, protest-driven hunger to be
differentiated from the anonymous, unchosen hunger of the destitute, was subsequently
and circularly verified by the act which it had enabled (He was a good man, we had better
listen to him; we listened to him, he must be a good man). In and of itself, such a
significant presence within the political environment of India does not necessarily lead to
1
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the topic of friendship. If anything, such a relationship of veneration, coupled with the
lack of intimate, reciprocal familiarity between Gandhi and the majority of his followers
would appear to undermine any element of friendship within the discourse of politics
surrounding Gandhi. However, it would be wise to remember that although such
achievements were possible only after Gandhi had become an international celebrity, the
framework of such tactics had been assembled together with fellow activists over the
course of several decades. In a sense, Gandhi’s “Mahatma” persona proved to be the
culmination of a wider political discourse which sought to reconcile the private struggles
of an individual life with the public stage of politics.
In this context, friendship emerges as a site of tension between these two spheres
of life, as well as a practice for navigating the contours of this tension. Within the
traditions of ascetic renunciation in which Gandhi’s political struggle is shaped,
friendship proves to be invaluable in maintaining and vindicating worldly political action
without compromising the ascetic bearing of the renunciate. Insofar as Gandhi’s
utilization of these traditions betrays a lingering attachment to an essentialized, masculine
subject, however, friendship also carries the traces of contradiction between a
commitment to a sovereign, self-identical subject and the fractured, power-saturated field
of identity.
Asceticism and Friendship: An Overview
Given the importance of Gandhi’s personal asceticism to his political image, the
relationship between asceticism and friendship deserves closer scrutiny. Describing the
phenomenon of religious world-rejection, Max Weber (1999) distinguishes between
asceticism, a practice in which the believer acts in the world as an instrument of the
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Divine, and mysticism, in which the goal is a state of “possession” of the Divine achieved
through contemplation. However, Weber notes that the distinction between the two can
be frustrated by outward appearance; in an effort to combat the creaturely aspects of the
body, “active asceticism in external bearing comes close to contemplative flight from the
world,” while a mystic cultivation of tranquility can be carried on internally even in the
midst of daily life.2 Such a distinction, therefore, relies upon the existence of an
“authentic” internal self against which to measure the outward appearance.
Yet whether manifesting through “called” labor, i.e., vocation3, or through mystic
tranquility, these forms of subjectivity must “ultimately condemn the social world to
absolute meaninglessness, or at least they hold that God’s aims concerning the social
world are utterly incomprehensible.”4 If such a position involves practices of benevolence
towards others, this benevolence is distributed disinterestedly for the sake of “anybody
who accidently happens to come his way-and merely because he happens to come his
way…an objectless devotion to anybody, not for man’s sake but purely for devotion’s
sake, or, in Baudelaire’s words, for the sake of ‘the soul’s sacred prostitution.’”5 Such
austerity of affect threatens to give pause to any discourse of friendship which might
intersect with such practices, freezing the playful exchanges of friendship within the
encasement of a total commitment to something beyond the friend himself. In a second
2
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stroke, however, such as a discourse of renunciation appropriates friendship as an
indispensable element, provided that it is properly managed.
Despite its rejection of worldly ends, asceticism partakes in and develops one of
the primary anxieties of friendship. This anxiety involves the danger of friends being
accounted amongst pragmata, that is, amongst the field of calculable and exchangeable
goods within an economy.6 This danger of reducing friendship to a commodity resonates
with the ascetic’s own aversion to being dominated by such goods, and the resolution of
this dilemma within friendship therefore contributes to the ascetic’s goal. Such resolution
can be effected by positing a dual nature within friendship; although attraction plays a
crucial role in inaugurating and sustaining a friendship, respect plays a no less significant
role in maintaining the relationship through establishing proper distancing between
friends, allowing each to appreciate the other without dismantling the boundaries
maintaining each’s identity.7 Within such an orbit, conducted and perpetuated by the
harmonious interplay of attraction and repulsion, the relationship of friendship maintains
an ineffaceable potential of interruption; either friend may “absolve” himself of the
relationship and the sustenance of friendship therefore comprises a continual affirmation
of each friend’s freedom of will. 8 This relationship between will and freedom indicates
the possibility of an ascetic mobilization of friendship which utilizes such relationships as
a means to reaffirm the ascetic’s renunciation of goods by exemplifying a non-economic
relationship.
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Through the cultivation of “proper” friendship, the ascetic can more sharply
delineate and reject the world of “things;” in doing so, however, the internal tensions of a
unified ascetic subject resurface at the very point of this friendship. Rather than assisting
the ascetic in overcoming pragmata, such a friendship risks concentrating all of these
relationships into the friend himself. The friend exists as a means towards renunciation
and the ascetic’s final ends are inevitably frustrated or called into question; either
renunciation remains dependent upon the friendship and therefore unfulfilled, or else the
friendship is discarded like an empty bottle once renunciation has been achieved.
Reconciling friendship with asceticism without undermining one or both requires a
division within the subject itself; the ends of ascetic friendship require that the terms of
the friendship remain secret even from the friends themselves, allowing the friendship to
achieve its work without devolving into a strategic affair.
Such a “secret” friendship, unspoken and unacknowledged, no doubt smacks of
the absurd. Taken to its outer extremities, this element of secrecy appears to collapse all
distinctions between friend and non-friend (how can we tell the difference anymore?)
while neglecting the shared spaces and practices which are both the signs and the
implements of friendship’s fecundity. For his own part, Mohandas Gandhi (1972)
deplored a certain manifestation of secrecy which threatened to conflate itself with
Gandhi’s own practice. “One man will sometimes prostrate himself before another,”
Gandhi writes, “although his heart is full of bitterness against the latter. This is not
humility, but cunning.”9 The creeping implication of such a conflation, in relation to
Gandhi’s own project, would be to reduce this project to an iteration of
9
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Nietzsche’s (1968) “slave morality.” Unlike his heroic counterpart, such a fellow makes a
craft out of cunning and deception. “His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding places, secret
paths, and back doors…he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to
wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble.”10
It is precisely such a reading that Gandhi remains at pains to defuse; he
unequivocally condemns those who hide behind non-violence as an excuse for cowardice.
In response to a group of villagers near Bettiah who had abandoned their homes and
families to the ravages of looters, Gandhi argues that “my non-violence fully
accommodated violence offered by those who did not feel non-violence and who had in
their keeping the honour of their womenfolk and children…Non-violence, therefore,
presupposes ability to strike.”11 In contrast to this hypocritical form of secrecy, however,
Gandhi extols another kind more closely aligned with the paradox of ascetic friendship.
Differentiating true humility from pretense, Gandhi writes that “a humble person is not
himself conscious of his humility…Inborn humility can never remain hidden, and yet the
possessor is unaware of its existence.”12 Of course, here the secret is known to everyone
but the renunciate himself, and it is just such open secrets which break down the barriers
of identity by removing the subject’s singular sovereignty of self-knowledge, retaining
the possibility of a friendship more radicalized than the renunciate may care to admit.
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This form of secrecy lies at the heart of the ascetic’s success, but its very presence
decenters the ascetic project from itself. It requires one “not to remain stuck to one’s own
detachment, that voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird who flies ever higher
to see ever more below him,”13 forcing the subject instead to risk the challenges of public
life. “Every choice human being,” Nietzsche writes, “strives instinctively for a citadel
and a secrecy where he is save from the crowd…excepting only the case in which he is
pushed straight to such men by a still stronger instinct, as a seeker after knowledge in the
great and exceptional sense.”14 Such an individual may be likened to Baudelaire’s (1995)
“man of the crowd,” a concept borrowed from Edgar Allan Poe and elaborated as a
representative of modern art. This man initially sits apart from the crowd, enjoying his
anonymity and ability to absorb the writhing mass while remaining unmoved by it. In an
instant, however, he spies a face which sends him hurtling into the crowd; like the
ascetic, this aesthete achieves a form of self-overcoming by opening himself to the public
square, not for commerce, but for friendship.15
Such an anecdote no doubt expresses the aim and seduction, as well as the
ambivalence of ascetic friendship. Here we shall do well to recall Aristotle’s dictum that
to love is superior to being loved. Whereas being loved is a passive, contingent state
which one may inhabit without knowing, the act of loving reaffirms the identity of the
lover as one who loves and places the lover in a position of observation over the beloved.
“The friendship I bear for someone, and no doubt love as well,” Derrida (1997) writes,
13
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expanding upon (and perhaps doubting) Aristotle’s premise, “cannot remain a secret for
myself. Even before it is declared (to the other, in a loud voice), the act of love would be
in itself declared.”16 Even as Baudelaire’s man of the crowd abandons his vantage point,
he is driven by an unquenchable desire to but see once more the fleeting face which has
so entranced him, a goal not unlike Gandhi’s (1957) own admission that “what I have
been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years-is self-realization, to see God face
to face…I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal.”17 This relationship to
the friend as exemplar, unrealizable object, and cipher for the Divine can be further
explicated, along with its political implications, by considering Gandhi’s politicization of
the Hindu text the Bhagavad Gita, a text which Gandhi claims had become “an infallible
guide of conduct. It became my dictionary of daily reference.”18
Responsibility, Renunciation, and the Bhagavad Gita
Despite his idiosyncratic reading of the text, Gandhi was by no means the first or
the only twentieth century thinker to recognize the political implications of the Bhagavad
Gita. Max Weber (1999) argued that the Gita successfully integrated warfare into the
totality of life-spheres, claiming that “this specialization of ethics allowed for Indian
ethic’s quite unbroken treatment of politics by following politics’ own laws and even
radically enhancing this royal art.”19 Weber presents a common reading of the Gita, one
that vindicates violence as a necessary element of politics and which establishes the
16
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ethical standards of politics on the basis of fidelity to the political vocation and personal
detachment from the outcomes of politics.20
A more radical proponent of the Gita’s ethics can be found in the Hindu
nationalist Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1988). Imploring his listeners to employ violence if
necessary in their struggle to cast of the yoke of British rule, Tilak advises them to “get
out of the Penal Code, enter into the extremely high atmosphere of the Bhagavad Gita,
and then consider the actions of great men.”21 He uses the Gita’s vocational ethics to
differentiate the ethics of ordinary life, in which murder would be unconscionable, from
the needs of extraordinary times when men must kill, not for their own personal
advancement, but for the good of others. Comparing the British to unwanted intruders,
Tilak provocatively insists “if thieves enter our house and we have not sufficient strength
in our wrists to drive them out, we should shut them up and burn them alive.”22
Tilak proves to be a formidable counterpart and predecessor to Gandhi in this
regard; his interpretation of the Gita, particularly in emphasizing its themes of worldly
action and unity of purpose, is echoed throughout Gandhi’s own work, even as Gandhi
mercilessly critiques his interpretation of violence in the text. For Tilak, the Gita’s
message was clear: “There is no empire lost by a free grant of concession by the rulers to
the ruled…Sri Krishna was sent to effect a compromise, but the Pandavas and Kauravas
were both organizing their forces to meet the contingency of failure of compromise. This
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is politics.”23 This would be the very reading which Gandhi would reject, while sharing
Tilak’s belief that the Gita had resolved the conflicts between knowledge, action, and
love and that it directed its adherents to a life of sacrifice.24
Unlike Tilak, Gandhi (1972) maintains that “the author of the Mahabharata has
not established the necessity of physical warfare; on the contrary he has proved its
futility. He has made the victors shed tears of sorrow and has left them nothing but a
legacy of miseries.”25 Instead, Gandhi reads the battlefield of Kuruksetra, the setting of
the story, as an allegory for the human conscience and the internal struggles contained
therein. After the second chapter, Gandhi argues, warfare recedes into the background
and the remainder of the poem develops as an edifying discourse between Arjuna and his
charioteer Krishna.26 While assenting that the Gita does not explicitly develop the
concept of non-violence, Gandhi eschews any contradiction between the two. He argues
that the morality of warfare is not at issue in the text, noting that Arjuna has already
fought and killed numerous times and that his moment of hesitation was due to personal
attachments, rather than an assessment of war itself. Instead, Gandhi finds the Gita to be
a sublime articulation of what Weber might term the “ascetic thesis:” the renunciation of
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action is futile because life is active by its very presence (breathing, eating, and so forth);
what must be surrendered instead is the mindset behind action which expects reward.27
Beyond simply recapitulating the themes of asceticism, Gandhi’s interpretation of
the Gita helps to illuminate the politics of friendship which inform his worldview. The
central relationship of the text occurs between Arjuna and Krishna, who is
simultaneously Arjuna’s friend and charioteer as well as an incarnation of the Divine.
Gandhi argues that although Krishna is the embodiment of perfection, he is himself
imaginary; although the character may have been based upon an actual historical figure,
Gandhi insists that his divinity is fictional, attributed to him subsequently by tradition.28
Approaching the theophany which marks the climax of the poem, Krishna responds to a
startled Arjuna, “By Me, unmanifest in form, this whole world is pervaded; all beings are
in Me, I am not in them.”29 In this view, every personal relationship, including friendship,
provides an insufficient but sustaining doorway to the Divine, and the theophany itself is
iterable within any relationship of friendship. Along with the insight that the Gita is not
“a collection of do’s and don’ts,” but that “what is lawful for one may be unlawful for
another,” this ethic of friendship helps to underscore Gandhi’s formulation of political
activism. However, it also falls prey to what Wendy Brown (1995) has criticized as a
preference safe, stable Truths over the danger, contestability, and multivocal realm of
politics 30
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Equality, Reform, and Tolerance
The approach to friendship implied by Gandhi’s reading of the Bhagavad Gita
proves helpful in tracing Gandhi’s use of friendship to navigate a fractured social terrain
of diffused identities and contradictory claims without renouncing his own claims to a
unity of will. The hypostatic Divine element which ostensibly lay behind even the image
of Krishna himself is for Gandhi, the Law in-and-for-itself as an impersonal, inaccessible
Absolute.31 Describing this Law in its relation to non-violence, Gandhi (1972) claims that
“the Law of Complete Love is the law of my being. Each time I fail, my effort shall be all
the more determined by my failure.”32 On another occasion, Gandhi writes that “Love is
reckless in giving away, oblivious as to what it gets in return. Love wrestles with the
world as with itself and ultimately gains mastery over all other Feelings…whether
mankind will consciously follow the law of love I do not know. But….the law will work,
just as the law of gravitation will work whether we accept it or not.”33
The transcendent status of this Law enables the Krishna-Arjuna event of the Gita
to be repeated within any encounter, a useful recourse for dealing with the problems of
equality and reform within the terms of Gandhi’s practice of friendship. This problem has
been formulated by Kant, amongst others, as a tension between the duty to correct an
erring friend and the danger of exposure and hierarchy this opens the friendship into.
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This duty, which radically distinguishes the friend from the well-wisher, posits an ethic
of care for the friend’s own interests as they exist apart from whatever use or pleasure
they provide.34 Friends find themselves within a unique position to offer productive
insights into each other’s character, yet this possibility fundamentally upsets both the
centered subject anchored to its own unassailable standard of self-knowledge, as well as
occasioning the possibility of one friend dominating the other by exploiting the other
from a vulnerable vantage point.
Max Weber (1999) notes a similar danger within such relationships, which he
says can often devolve into “the most intimate coercion of the soul of the less brutal
partner…a sophisticated enjoyment of oneself in the other.”35 However, the ethic of
friendship found within Gandhi’s reading of the Gita diffuses this danger by ensuring that
the “Truth” of the reform lay outside the friends themselves and that the roles of Krishna
and Arjuna are fundamentally contingent and dependent upon reference to the Law. In
this way, the problem of reconciling equality with reform can be managed and a
relationship between friendship and justice established. Democratic theorist Danielle
Allen (2006) has suggested that friendship as a form of skillful practice can be used to
moderate the law’s excesses while maintaining the law as a living practice. “Law is not
an artifact,” she writes, “or made object that embodies the one will of the people once
and for all, but a practice in which any and every citizen may be involved at any
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moment.”36 Allen notes that habits of friendship can be used to cultivate good citizenship
by broadening the scope of justice beyond the repayment of debt; whereas the justice of
distributing to each as she deserves is compatible with miserliness, mistrust, and the
breakdown of a civic culture of sharing and acknowledging sacrifice, the justice of
friendship enables citizens to moderate their claims against each other beneath what they
are strictly entitled to and to deliberate more effectively by predicting and
accommodating their fellow citizens’ prospective positions in policy debates on the front
end.37 In this respect, friendship remains a law above the law, an uncodifiable
relationship which manages the interpretation and enforcement of the law itself.
Reconsidering Gandhi’s politics of friendship in light of its relationship to justice,
Gandhi presents a justice of friendship more closely aligned with Plato than with Allen.
In The Republic Socrates and his interlocutors discuss the topic of justice, and a
preliminary definition of justice is offered as each person receiving what he is due.
Socrates, however, complicates the issue by suggesting that it would be improper to give
a friend his weapons if he was not in right mind; preventing an inebriated friend from
driving his own car would perhaps be a suitable contemporary example.38 In this
instance, the justice of friendship not only supersedes the ordinary justice of ownership,
but it exercises power without fundamentally implicating the friends within a relationship
of power. Such distinctions will prove crucial for Gandhi’s own political socialization
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and practices of friendship, producing relationships which could alternatively be
described as antagonistic cooperation or friendly obstruction.
In the unfolding tale of his autobiography The Story of My Experiments With
Truth, friendship plays an indispensable role in guiding Gandhi’s (1957) political
development. Despite its formal arrangement as a series of interconnected stories
detailing the life of an individual, the work, written near the height of Gandhi’s noncooperation campaigns of the 1920’s, is an explicitly political text, insofar as the
discourse of “Truth” carries significant political weight for Gandhi. “It is not my purpose
to attempt a real autobiography,” Gandhi warns, “I simply want to tell the story of my
numerous experiments with truth, and as my life consists of nothing but those
experiments, it is true that the story will take the shape of an autobiography.”39
Despite the importance of friendship for the text, its first appearance proves
remarkably ambiguous; Gandhi relates the experience of befriending an acquaintance
with the intent to reform him, but is instead seduced by the friend into eating meat.
Whether the incident was actually a formative experience for Gandhi or simply an
appropriation of a childhood memory for his present political views is of little matter, for
the incident sets the tone for Gandhi’s friendships throughout the remainder of the text.
Reflecting upon his double failure (he fails to reform and he is himself corrupted),
Gandhi muses:
A reformer cannot afford to have close intimacy with him whom he seeks to
reform. True friendship is an identity of souls rarely to be found in this world.
Only between like natures can friendship be altogether worthy and enduring.
Friends react on one another. Hence, in friendship there is very little scope for
reform. I am of the opinion that all exclusive intimacies are to be avoided; for
man takes to vice far more readily than virtue. And he who would be friends with
39
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God must remain alone, or make the whole world his friend. I may be wrong, but
my effort to cultivate an intimate friendship proved a failure.40
Although this experience does not prevent Gandhi from establishing numerous
politically effective friendships, the tenor of these friendships often proves to be one of
struggle. In England Gandhi’s identity is fixed to some extent by his attempts to resist the
temptations offered by English culture to break the vow of vegetarianism he had made to
his mother upon his departure. He recalls a friend who had adamantly attempted to
convince him to eat meat, even going so far as to read him excerpts from Bentham’s
Theory of Utility.41 Ever recalcitrant, however, Gandhi found himself instead drawn to
the burgeoning culture of vegetarian dining and activism. He found in Henry Salt’s Plea
for Vegetarianism a compelling argument to accept Vegetarianism as a choice, rather
than the imposition of a vow and was elected to the Executive Committee of the
Vegetarian Society.42 For a variety of encounters, tolerance proves to be a crucial
technique for reconciling Gandhi’s discourse of religious universalism with the
exigencies of political struggle, enabling him to maintain the pretext of friendship, even
within intractable political struggles.
His early encounters with British society are indicative of the complex
relationship which develops between Gandhi and the “British,” both as discrete
individuals and as a collective identity. In South Africa, Gandhi claims that his
acquaintance with British Christians proved seminal in his religious development, even as
he stalwartly rejected their premises. “Though I took a path my Christian friends had not
40
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intended for me,” he reminisces, “I have remained forever indebted to them for the
religious quest that they awakened in me.”43 One of these friends, Mr. Coates, had spared
himself no small pain in shielding Gandhi from the racist environment of South Africa,
yet early in their acquaintance had attempted to convince Gandhi to destroy a religious
necklace given to him by his mother, insisting that such a trinket bespoke a superstitious
mind and was unbecoming upon one such Gandhi.44
Gandhi himself has used the term “tolerance” to describe his approach to
difference. As a member of the Vegetarian Society in London, he had fought the
expulsion of Dr. Allison for his advocacy of contraception, despite Gandhi’s own
aversion to the practice, maintaining that a member’s moral views apart from
vegetarianism were irrelevant (read nonpolitical) with respect to the society. 45 However,
such practices of tolerance have been extensively critiqued by Wendy Brown (2006),
who has argued that such manifestations of tolerance can operate as a “disciplinary
strategy of liberal individualism,” positioning the subjects and objects of tolerance within
a hierarchical relationship while deftly depoliticizing and sublimating the differences
which form the basis of this domination.46 This form of discourse, which Brown claims
contribute to “the production of strong local truths and excessively thin collective and
public ones,” essentializing the entire identity of the tolerated on the basis of certain
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actions or conditions, such as sexual preference, ethnicity, and so forth.47 Tolerance is
presented as a form of self-overcoming on the part of the tolerant subject, for whom what
is foreign is disarmed of its capacity to meaningfully affect the subject so as to be
incorporated within an asymmetrical relationship with the dominant (the tolerated
partakes of the tolerant subject’s “Truth” but this is not reciprocated).48
Gandhi (1972) himself appears to be aware of this potentially domineering aspect
of tolerance; writing on the prospect of Hindu-Muslim unity, Gandhi insists that such a
unity of purpose must not be allowed to efface the crucial differences between the
communities. To this end, he warns that “it would be utterly impossible for Hindus and
Mohamedans to intermarry and yet retain intact each other’s religion,” believing that
such a sudden eruption of intimacy between the two communities would simply foster
greater opportunity for violence without contributing to the political basis for the union.49
He goes on to insist that “it is not necessary for toleration that I approve of what I
tolerate. I heartily dislike drinking, meat-eating, and smoking, but I tolerate all these,”
thus relating the objects of tolerance to practices he considers poisonous.50 The
association of such habits with political tolerance indicates a lingering commitment to a
discourse of civilization on Gandhi’s part. In Hind Swaraj Gandhi (1997) claims that
“civilization is that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty,” and he
presents Indian civilization as being incomparably superior to European civilization on
47

Ibid, p. 39.

48

Ibid, p. 26.

49

Gandhi, Mohandas. Hindu-Muslim Unity, in Gandhi Selected Writings, p.168.

50

Ibid, p. 169.

40

the basis that it better expresses the conditions of “proper conduct” and limits the
avariciousness of man, rather than accentuating it.51 Although he had attempted to reverse
the terms of this discourse by positing the “West” as violent and decadent in contrast to
the fidelity of Indian civilization to Truth, Love, and Non-Violence, he nevertheless is
forced to repeat the terms under which he and his fellow colonial subjects are
marginalized by this very discourse.
Such is the common plight encountered by resistance as a political practice; “a
vital tactic in much political work as well as for mere survival,” Wendy Brown writes,
“resistance goes nowhere in particular, has no inherent attachments, and hails no
particular vision…resistance is an effect of and reaction to power, not an arrogation of
it.”52 This discourse of civilization which recolonizes the thinking of both Gandhi and
many of his contemporaries infiltrates their projects as a seemingly benign ethic of
reserved benevolence and a willingness to grant the benefit of the doubt towards
difference, but it in fact reinstates a colonial binary between the central, “civilized”
society which bears the mantle of the universal in opposition to the marginal, “primitive”
societies under its auspices which are incapable of tolerance.53
Gandhi’s (1972) relationship to tolerance, however, is more complex than the
conventional liberal narrative of tolerance would suggest. Despite his earlier
pronouncements upon intermarriage and tolerance, Gandhi later appears to have
reconsidered the value of this power-laden discourse. “I do not like this word,” Gandhi
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later writes, “but could not think of a better one. Tolerance implies a gratuitous
assumption of other faiths to one’s own.”54 Whereas Brown’s (2006) critique of tolerance
concerns itself in part with the depoliticization of difference, divorcing the social from
the most cherished beliefs of its inhabitants, Gandhi (1972) attempts to mobilize these
differences as a political force against empire, arguing that there is “no line of
demarcation drawn between salvation and worldly pursuit.”55 Furthermore, Gandhi
appears willing in his writings to accept a reciprocity within tolerance which destabilizes
the identity of a single, sovereign subject of tolerance.
Turning the discourse of tolerance against British colonialism, Gandhi (1972)
establishes the terms of Indian resistance not as a question of enmity but rather one of
hospitality. He maintains that the British continue to rule in India due to Indian tolerance
of their presence and notes that if the Indian people refused to cooperate in making the
colony profitable for Britain, that the British would have no recourse but to leave, as they
had done in Somalia, where, “the moment its administration ceased to be a paying
proposition they evacuated it.”56 He argues that the British should be treated as guests
who had abused the right of hospitality and that by refusing any form of voluntary
assistance to the British, the Indian people would be well within their rights as wronged
hosts. At this stage of the colonial relationship, Gandhi insists that no true concession
from the British government is possible; any “gift” rendered by the British would be a
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gift to themselves, securing their right to continue ruling in India.57 Most intriguing of all,
perhaps, is Gandhi’s use of friendship as a superior object of loyalty to the empire; he
writes, “I hold a real substantial unity between the Hindus and Mussalmans infinitely
superior to the British connection…If I had to choose between the honour of the Punjab,
anarchy, neglect of education, shutting out of all legislative activity, and the British
connection, I would choose the honour of the Punjab and all it meant, even anarchy.”58
This declaration is indicative of Gandhi’s approach to friendship, insofar as it associates
the wrongs suffered by the Muslims as an affront to honor, rather than as a material
injury, and because it implies an adoption of a cause that is not one’s own, but for the
friendship one feels for the party wronged.
This discourse of friendship between Hindus and Muslims occupies much of
Gandhi’s later thinking and is perhaps a key element to understanding the modifications
of his earlier positions on tolerance. Responding to criticisms from fellow Hindus that he
had not publicly opposed the slaughter of cattle by Muslims, he claims that attempting to
bargain with the Muslim population over the matter would simply undermine the tenuous
cooperation between the communities; furthermore, he notes that Hindu rulers continue
to serve beef to British guests, and that this, alongside the perpetuation of the Dalits’
marginalization, should occupy the Hindu community’s efforts at reform before assuming
a position of moral superiority against India’s Muslims.59
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This response is tendered in light of Gandhi’s unequivocal support of the Khalifat
movement in India, which sought to pressure the British into preserving the Islamic
caliphate centered in the defeated Ottoman Empire.60 Gandhi’s interest in supporting the
cause reflects a disposition of friendly deference, adopting a friend’s cause even when
one is not directly implicated. More significantly, however, it also exposes the
importance of shared suffering to Gandhi’s political thinking, together with the
limitations of such an approach. Wendy Brown (1995) has indicated the dangers of such
“wounded attachments,” noting that a politics grounded in injury tends to reinforce this
injury as the inescapable essence of its victims and that such a politics risks descending
into recriminations and ressentiment, contenting itself with empty rancor and paralysis,
rather than attempting to overcome the limitations of injury and share in the exercise of
power.61 Such a thinking appears to be at work when Gandhi recalls an anecdote about a
ship at sea during a storm:
The gale in which we were caught was so violent and prolonged that the
passengers became alarmed…All became one in face of the common
danger…with the disappearance of danger disappeared also the name of God from
their lips…But the storm had made me one with the passengers…the friendship I
thus formed stood me, as we shall see, in very good stead.62
This political mobilization of suffering appears to be foundation of the trust which
Gandhi had accumulated over several decades of activism; by presenting himself as a
figure who suffered together with those whom he sought to reform, his words and deeds,
spreading through the ordinary channels of communication, provided a powerful canon
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within the traditions of Indian nationalism which could appeal to Indians from across the
spectrum of conventional colonial identities. However, other aspects of Gandhi’s work
help to underscore the dangers and limitations of such an approach.
Although he does not explicitly state it, Gandhi (1957) includes in his
autobiography the fact that he was ejected from his own caste for leaving India, thus
aligning Gandhi as a fellow sufferer with the Dalits.63 However, his writings on the state
of the Dalits expose this suffering as a limitation of his political imagination; in an article
in Young India, Gandhi (1927) warns the Dalit community that they must be patient with
the rest of India and resist the temptations of violence, lest they incur the wrath of the
majority, ruin the progress which has already been made, and compromise the sanctity of
their cause. To justify his position, he notes that he has adopted an untouchable child, that
he himself dines freely with them, and that he will be ready to suffer with them in any
struggle for their liberation.64 Nevertheless, his position confines the political agency of
the Dalits within an inescapable discourse of oppression and loss.
Another key manifestation of this tendency can be found within Gandhi’s (1957)
politics of sexuality; his own injury in this matter takes the form of his childhood
marriage to his wife Kasturbai; Gandhi repeatedly laments the barbarity of childhood
marriage and considers his lust for his wife to have been one of his chief faults.65 She
remains a silent figure throughout his writings, always a model of virtue, but never a
speaking subject. Gandhi claims that Satyagraha, the term he and his followers coined
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for their non-violent resistance, was born at the moment he undertook the vow of
brahmacharya, or chastity, and he mentions casually that he had not even broached the
subject with her until after the fact.66 This collusion between celibacy and nonviolence is
intriguing within Gandhi’s work, because it opens sexuality as a sight of masculine
domination, while simultaneously reconfiguring that domination as a regulative principle
of the female body: sexuality is conceived as an inherent violence of males against
females, but for this reason female sexuality is immediately excluded as illegitimate.
Although this principle simultaneously regulates the male body, it positions the female
subject as an object of seduction which is regulated by the male-centered principle but
which must itself undertake responsibility for the preservation of its “purity.” Perhaps the
clearest expression of both the limits and the possibilities for female agency within this
discourse can be heard in Gandhi’s exhortation that a woman must learn to say no “even
to her husband.”67
In this view, it is by turns moving and tragic to consider that Kasturbai
died in prison four years before Gandhi himself was assassinated.68 For his own part,
Gandhi had spent much of his public life in prison, and his mobilization of ascetic
discourse into politics rendered the body itself as a fleshly well of solitude. His politics of
friendship therefore are both enabled and limited by a positioning of subjects as fellow
suffers, finding solidarity in a common dungeon but for that reason unable to ever escape,
except, perhaps in the fleeting moments of unexpected intimacy, having “heard the key
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turn in the door once and turn once only...each in his prison thinking of the key, each
confirms a prison. Only at nightfall aethereal rumours.”69
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Chapter 3: Leninist Dialectics and Revolutionary Friendship
Moving from Gandhi’s ascetic approach to friendship towards a one drawn from
the political thought of Vladimir Lenin, the theme of “proper” friendship re-emerges as
an implicit criterion for interpersonal relationship. The proper criteria for friendship in
this mode of thought can be drawn from the concept of class consciousness, particularly
in its role as a mediating concept which explains the dynamics of struggle between a
multiplicity of classes and which provides a means of distinguishing the differences and
dependencies between various class subjectivities. Drawing from both Lenin’s own
writings, as well as the theorist Georg Lukács’ readings of the Leninist project, the
following chapter shall attempt to sketch an outline of Lenin’s politics of friendship by
noting an ambivalence towards friendship which this project seeks to overcome through
the concept of class consciousness.
Given the importance of dialectical thought to this project, which shall be
explained further in the pages that follow, the application of this mode of thought to
friendship must be considered. Amidst all of innumerable possible articulations and
appearances of friendship, there appears to be an attempt to move beyond immediately
given circumstances which could provide a common thread to the concept of friendship.
An example relevant to Lenin’s political framework would be the potential for friendship
between a factory owner and one of his employees. A chance encounter may occasion an
unexpected rapport between the two. Conversations may start to stray outside the bounds
of the factory floor, and an appreciation of and familiarity with each other’s life outside
the realm of transactions and factory discipline may occur. Such a friendship could
potentially vacate the site of its founding, in this case the factory, carrying the friends
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together to theatres, ballparks, and other venues which have little pertinence to the
relationship’s founding conditions. In this instance friendship may even present a
counterweight to the initial, economic claims between the two, promoting a certain
leniency against the more stringent laws of ownership and propriety….to a point.
This point is precisely where private property produces a limiting horizon to
friendship within a commercial society. Although the owner may forgive his friend a few
slack days from time to time or else the worker may choose to occasionally add a few
voluntary hours of work to his schedule during a busy season, if such license becomes the
norm between them, then the business side of the relationship could potentially collapse
as the friendship assumes an antagonistic relationship with the site of its birth. No longer
an excess within this relationship, friendship now establishes its own competing claims
against it, producing a dialectical contradiction which often amounts to a death sentence
for friendship: business must typically take precedence over friendship, for we cannot eat
or pay rent with friendship.
However, such a dialectical configuration of friendship indicates its potential role
within revolutionary struggle; the division between friendship and livelihood can be read
through a Marxian lens as one of the numerous contradictions which plague our society
and which can be resolved only through the abolition of private property, removing the
disparity between friendship and the reproduction of sensuous, material life. In this
respect, the abolition of private property presents an intriguing twist upon Aristotle’s
recommendation that lawmakers strive to produce the constitution which is most
conducive to friendship, in this case by abolishing the primary obstacle to friendship
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within capitalist society.1 A precautionary effort must be made, however, to discipline
friendship in accordance with revolutionary struggle, lest it become merely another pillar
of reaction, dampening class actors’ consciousness of the struggle being waged beneath
the varnished surface of capitalist society by deadening the pain of this strife with empty
sentimentality and reinforcing counterrevolutionary habits through the force of
conformity.
Herein lies the ambiguity of friendship within Lenin’s thought; on the basis of
class consciousness, friendship between owners and workers is impossible because the
underlying class subjectivity of each is irreconcilable. At best, such friendships are
insubstantial eruptions of social contradictions which do not actually transform the social
base, while at worst they are reactionary forces binding the workers tighter to their own
exploitation. However, class consciousness also provides a basis for authentic friendship
both within the proletariat and between the proletariat and its “natural” allies, such as the
peasantry. Properly disciplined, friendship can provide a mode of sociality outside the
existing structures of citizenship while producing the personal connections which can
make up a transformed social whole.
In the first section of this chapter, a brief overview will be given to the terms
“dialectic” and “class consciousness” within its Marxist-Leninist context and some of the
implications of the dialectical method will be applied to friendship. The next section will
analyze the interactions between class consciousness, discipline, and the revolutionary
vanguard in Lenin’s political project, particularly with respect to the role which
friendship disciplined by class consciousness plays as a mediating force between the
1
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revolutionary party and the proletariat. The conclusion shall relate Lenin’s implicit
mobilization of friendship with Carl Schmitt’s identification of “the enemy” as the central
concept of the political. This juxtaposition will be used to address the opening of
friendship into a discourse of enmity and mistrust within the Leninist framework,
suggesting that Lenin’s thought unintentionally betrays a conservative recoil parallel to
Schmitt’s own by seeking to preserve a clear and determining figure of “the enemy” in
politics, in effect sacrificing the fluidity of friendship to the “certainty” of the class
enemy.
Dialectics and Class Consciousness
The concept of the dialectical method has proven indispensible for a wide family
of Marxist analysis. Georg Lukács (1971a) begins his studies in History and Class
Consciousness by insisting that the condition of orthodoxy for Marxists is not whether
they accept every or even any of the results of Marx’s research but that they retain his
method of dialectical materialism. Only by conceiving theory in relation to the whole of
the socio-material world, by bearing in mind that “categories are therefore but forms of
being, conditions of existence,” can the theorist actually take what Lukács calls a
“decisive step.”2 Unlike a metaphysical approach, he argues, the dialectical method is one

in which definitions are in a continuous process of transition, replacing rigid causality
with interactions while intellectually expressing the material possibility of the proletarian
revolution.
This contrast between metaphysics and dialectics is emphasized as well by
Friedrich Engels (1972) in his 1880 pamphlet Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, where
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Engels argues that eighteenth century thought, with a few exceptions, had neglected the
Heraclitean tradition which conceived of reality as a whole in flux, with each particular
piece constantly in a state of emerging and dissipating, in favor of a model of thought
drawn from the exact sciences. This model, which seeks to inventory and stabilize
various concepts within the whole, offers precise, mechanical details but cannot account
for development. Drawing from the methods of exact science, this approach can
rigorously organize its given materials but dissimulates the process by which these
materials become available, producing a habit of thought inclined to squinting at objects
in isolation from the whole.3
In a work entitled simply Lenin: A Study of the Unity of His Thought, Lukács
(1971b) argues that “Lenin is the greatest thinker to have been produced by the
revolutionary working-class movement since Marx” on the basis of his ability to perceive
all problems of the revolution from the dialectical standpoint. Rather than abstracting
universal laws from parochial circumstances (the English factory system in the case of
Marx and the Russian Revolution in the case of Lenin), Lukács insists that both Marx and
Lenin successfully perceived within these circumstances the actuality of revolutionary
struggle with respect to the totality of social phenomena.4 Against deterministic readings
of Marxism, Lukács maintains that the dialectical method respects the irreducibility of
individual events and that its object of analysis is instead the manner in which
contradictions within the entirety of production leave their trace upon the particular event
and limit its possibilities. He writes: “the dialectic is no more than the conceptual
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expression of the fact that the development of society is in reality contradictory, and that
these contradictions (class contradictions, the antagonistic character of their economic
existence, etc.) are the basis and kernel of all events.”5 What must be added, however, is
the qualification that the dialectical process is one of dissolution and that its inevitability
is therefore confined to the disintegration of standing social forms, rather than
determining their positive content and direction.6
This sense of dialectics as the study of contradictions within the social whole
manifesting themselves in discrete events showcases a possibility of friendship as a
relationship of liberty within the dialectical movement of history. While friendships may
be torn asunder by the sweeping tide of history if they remain bounded by the
contradictory premises of a given means of production, friendship can also constitute a
freely-made progressive step amidst the disintegration of a form of life. Such are the
possibilities indicated by Marx (1972) when he contrasts the normal behavior of money
within history with the transformation of its use by proletarian organizations.
Marx understands money to be the actual unity of capitalist society, comprising
the alienated labor power of the community; rather than providing a neutral measure for
translating values and facilitating exchanges, Marx argues that money effects the
alienation of laborers from their products. The more value the working classes produce,
the less powerful the individual units of value become, and the power of money within
the social whole increases as individual units of currency become less powerful, creating
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an ever-greater need to stockpile ever-greater quantities of money.7 In contrast to the
asceticism of money, which holds bare, destitute life as its singular unit of measure, Marx
observes that the association of workers opposes money’s domineering effects by reconceiving sociality as an end in itself. The logic of money sets the enjoyment of life in
opposition to its security; because the individual unit of money expresses an unendurable
form of life (the life expressed by a single dollar, for instance), these quanta of currency
must hoarded, and every expenditure which is not an investment, not a form of power
exercised for the purpose of gathering more money, is rendered as an inefficiency, as a
loss of potential gain.8 For socialist workmen, however, Marx notes that the initial
purpose of their meetings, to discuss theory and tactical considerations, often gives way
to an enjoyment of each other’s company and a subsequent demystification of the opaque
haze which currency casts upon sensuous life, enabling workers to utilize money towards
ends antithetical to its dialectical structure. He writes:
Such things as smoking, drinking, eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or
means that bring together. Company, association, and conversation, which again
has society as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere
phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from
their work-hardened bodies.9
Here the role of friendship as both gratis within and counter to the economic relationship
is made explicit, even as the opposition between the two roles is dissolved, and this
mobilization of sensuous social activity as a movement within the dialectical relationship
proves to be crucial for Marx’s successors.
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This dialectical approach is precisely what Lenin (1978) defends in his polemic
against the critic Mr. N. Mikhailovsky. Leveling familiar criticisms against Marx,
Mikhailovsky insists that Marx drew inappropriate generalizations from the English
factory system, that he produced nothing fundamentally new within economic theory,
instead compiling previous observations encyclopedically, and that Marx superimposes
natural laws upon the subjective phenomena of society.10 In response, Lenin scathingly
retorts that Mikhailovsky, rather than arguing with Marx, has unwittingly reproduced the
various premises which Marx had critiqued, providing nothing to the conversation except
another opportunity to restate the principles of dialectical materialism. He notes that
Mikhailovsky’s recourse to subjectivist sociology betrays a stale attempt to keep separate
the production of values from the political basis of their circulation and represents
nothing more than a worn-out bourgeois sleight-of-hand which assumes the social
conditions it purports to explain to be ready-made expressions of psychological
intentions.11
Within this polemic, Lenin also offers a glimpse of his own understanding of
dialectics. He vehemently rejects the characterization of Marx as a primarily economic
thinker, claiming that Marx did not ignore the ideological superstructure so much as
provide a method for the relentless scrutiny of ideology on the basis of the social whole.
Arguing that Marx displayed capitalist society as a living unity, Lenin claims that “Marx
put an end to the view of society being a mechanical aggregation of individuals which
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allows all sorts of modification at the will of the authorities.”12 He presents a view of
Marx’s work as a scientific study of a single development, effective for its keen
understanding and demonstration of the dialectical process, rather than a model to be
applied indiscriminately, leaving open the theoretical possibility for a proletarian
revolution in Russia, despite its disparities with the more advanced capitalist societies.13
This move within dialectical thought itself can be read as an attempt to preserve the
economic findings of Marx while adapting them to the unexpected demands of a dynamic
philosophy of praxis.
Given the importance of “praxis” to the concept of friendship within this
revolutionary outlook (a politically relevant friendship denotes a form of political
practice), the philosophy of praxis bears greater scrutiny. The Italian theorist Antonio
Gramsci (2000) notes that the philosophy of praxis is itself a superstructure, which is to
say that it is an ideological terrain in which elements of society may become conscious of
themselves. In this perspective, “ideology” refers to the mental reflections of material
conditions which often serve to mask those conditions. For example, Marx criticizes
Bruno Bauer’s critique of religion for ignoring the actual social conditions for which
religion provides merely an abstract, ideological representation.14
Unlike other philosophies which strive to peacefully resolve the contradictory
interpretations and interests of society, Gramsci claims that the philosophy of praxis “is
itself the theory of those contradictions” and that it affirms the struggles of subordinate
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classes against pernicious ideologies by making explicit the “rapid transience” and
precarious historiographies of ideology as such.15 The relationship between
superstructural formations and their economic bases is more complex than simple
causation, Gramsci maintains, being instead a product of the former’s interpretations of
the latter. As a result, he cautions his readers to avoid confusing “organic ideologies,”
those which carry the potential for productive criticism and reinterpretation of the
economic base, with those which are merely arbitrary and willed and which therefore
produce only “individual movements.”16 This emphasis upon the active role of
consciousness within class struggle, while superficially appearing to be a concession to
idealism, is instead a re-emphasis upon the relationship between self-creation, its
limitations, and revolutionary organization.
The importance of ideology for Gramsci is tied to his conception of conformism.
Gramsci insists that all humans conform to some mode of thinking about the world or
another, that purely individual thought is a comedic abstraction. However, when a world
conception is sporadic and uncritical, it fails to be contemporaneous with its own history.
Instead, various fragments of archaic prejudice and half-truth comingle confusedly with
accurate apprehensions of the world, and the resulting subject is a “walking
anachronism” who is passively shaped by the march of events without taking a hand in
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the recreation of his own worldview.17 Such a plight is characteristic of anyone who faces
a wide gap between his intellectual convictions and his daily activity, and while this
discrepancy bears the traces of wider contradictions within the socio-historical whole,
consciousness of this condition can mean the difference between integrating and
overcoming past follies versus repeating them ad nauseum.18
This approach towards ideology, which conceives of consciousness itself as a
political battleground, helps to foreground the concept of class consciousness, which this
chapter argues is crucial for understanding the Leninist politics of friendship. Like Lenin,
both Gramsci and Lukács emphasize the importance of the distinctive quality of
proletarian class consciousness: whereas bourgeois consciousness cannot conceive of
class struggle except as an interminable process, the proletariat must ask themselves what
is to come after the struggle is concluded, and Gramsci insists that “the mere fact that the
workers raise these questions and attempt to answer them means that the elements of an
original proletarian civilization already exist.”19 For Lukács (1971a) the proletariat
themselves embody the limits of bourgeois consciousness, resolving the contradictions
inherent therein, and for this reason Lukács writes that “only the conscious will of the
proletariat will be able to save mankind from the impending catastrophe.”20
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In theorizing class consciousness, Lukács is careful to distinguish this concept
from the psychological consciousness of either individuals or groups. Instead, this form
of consciousness represents the totality of historical causes which translate themselves
into individual motivations, often unconsciously. It is an imputed consciousness, the
assortment of objectively possible actions capable of being taken by a class if it were to
come to complete self-consciousness.21 For pre-capitalist classes, this form of
consciousness was always behind actors’ explicit consciousness, and as a result, history,
despite being a product of conscious, goal-directed behavior, typically yielded results
which were in complete contradiction with the actors’ stated goals. The revolutionary
innovation of the bourgeois class was to make explicit the economic relationships of
society and to use this knowledge as a weapon against absolutism and feudal privilege.
However, once in power, the bourgeois consciousness must necessarily become a
mendacious consciousness, obscuring from itself the full ramifications of its own success
lest it destroy itself.22
These contradictions within bourgeois consciousness manifest themselves within
the confusion of bourgeois history. Two opposing historical theses, equally valid from its
own perspective, emerge from this consciousness. History becomes by turns either an
argument for the inevitable emergence of capitalist institutions or else an irrational series
of loosely-connected scenes without purpose or progress.23 Arbitrary fatalism and
arbitrary voluntarism are the only tenable perspectives for bourgeois historians, yet
21
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Lukács maintains that such a dilemma will only haunt “an undialectical mind” and
commends Marx for dissolving this contradiction as a necessary expression of the
antagonisms within capitalist society produced within its own terms of thought.24
The Revolutionary Vanguard and the Politics of Exposure
For Lenin (1975), class consciousness is indispensible for his conception of the
revolutionary struggle. Against thinkers who maintained that such consciousness could
be achieved by the proletariat spontaneously, however, Lenin maintains the need for a
vanguard party which could introduce the necessary consciousness from without. He
argues that spontaneity is synonymous with the path of least resistance and that the
proletarian class, of its own accord, can only develop a trade unionist consciousness,
learning how to occasionally negotiate for better wages rather than abolishing the wage
system altogether. “Modern socialist consciousness,” he writes, can arise only on the
basis of profound scientific knowledge,” and the purpose of the party in this view is to
raise the proletariat to just such an awareness.25
Against his “Economist” critics, who argued that Lenin and his compatriots were
ignoring the drab, everyday economic struggle of the workers in favor of theoretical
purity, Lenin retorts that the theoretical struggle is crucial for ferreting out the elements
of opportunism which he insists his rivals represent. He rejects the “middle parties” for
dangerously blurring crucial distinctions and promoting reformism thinly disguised as
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revolutionary preparation.26 In the wake of the repressed 1905 uprising, he asserts that
Russia’s intellectual class was inadequately prepared and that any insistence that the
Russian proletariat was insufficiently mature was merely a substitute for the intellectuals’
own failures.27
Instead of attempting to educate the workers about conditions of which they are
already fully aware and resistant to within the realm of the factory, Lenin insists that the
proper role of the intellectuals is to expose the workers to experiences outside of factory
life in order to prepare the workers to take a leading role within society. Propaganda
detailing the horrors and iniquities of factory life may be useful in conveying to workers
the fact that their experiences are not isolated ones, but Lenin maintains that the working
class stands to gain far more by engaging with segments of society outside itself, by
learning the strengths and weaknesses of the other classes and how each engages in the
class struggle.28 These forms of exposure, within the Leninist political framework, are
indispensible for training the proletariat to recognize and combat all forms of tyranny,
rather than simply the forms encountered within the factory, and this association between
openness to strangers and political effectiveness portends an intriguing encounter
between these political discourses of revolutionary struggle and the concept of friendship.
The dispute within the Social Democrats over the party’s conditions of
membership, which helped to propel the split between the Bolshevik and Menshevik
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elements, offers an educative glimpse at the distinctive work played by class
consciousness within the Leninist project. Furthermore, the nature of this dispute,
centered as it was on questions of association and belonging, helps to indicate the
Leninist approach to friendship. Whereas the Mensheviks had argued for a more
inclusive party structure, Lenin and his associates considered this position to be
“intellectual anarchism,” a loosening of the organizational skills and dedication which
were the proletariat’s only real weapons within the class struggle. 29 Instead, Lenin
reaffirmed his earlier conviction that the party must be composed of professional
revolutionaries, rather than amateurs, lest its organization falter and it find itself
unprepared.30
Through its approach to the political party, the Leninist discourse of revolutionary
struggle presents friendship as a concept which must be subjugated to the exigencies of
politics. Although friendship and party membership are not necessarily synonymous, the
party clearly indicates a platform where friendships between individuals can express
themselves most forcefully as political content. However, as Lukács (1971b) indicates in
his exegesis of Lenin’s party politics, the trajectory of individual action within the party
must be determined by “the social existence of the class and its resulting classconsciousness;” such actions “are not undertaken by him on behalf of the class but are the
culmination of class activity itself.”31 In this light, the discriminating selection of party
members characteristic of the Bolshevik position acts as a safeguard against friendships
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which could dampen the revolutionary effectiveness of the party, while producing an
environment in which friendship between “professional” revolutionaries can translate
itself into “the culmination of class activity itself.”
This regulation of friendship is closely bound into a politics of enmity; in a
universe of open and secret enemies,” Lukács writes, “to maintain the rule of the
proletariat at all costs” must be the guiding principle of party organizations.32 Lenin’s
(1975) insistence upon the workers’ openness to the other elements of society is qualified
by the fact that most of these elements are the proletariat’s enemies within the class
struggle, and the concept of class consciousness here serves a sound basis for preventing
proletarians from losing their footing in these social exposures and having their political
power appropriated from them by hostile classes. Against the uncertain but necessary
exposures of the proletarian political education, Lenin posits the party as a secure basis
for distinguishing legitimate revolutionary friendship from its opportunistic counterparts.
Lenin warns of the danger of police spies at party meetings who attempt to provoke the
party towards reckless violence while taking note of key members, and against such
saboteurs he writes, “Keep at it, gentlemen, do your best! Whenever you place a trap in
the path of the workers…we will see to it that you are exposed.”33
Conclusion: Class Enemies and Reactive Politics
Here, where the basis of friendship between the vanguard and the people and
within the vanguard itself rests upon a clear identification of the enemy, the revolutionary
thought of Lenin, Lukács, and countless others unexpectedly intersects with the
32
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conservative theories of Carl Schmitt (1996). While rejecting the substance of Marxist
thought, Schmitt acknowledges that the polemical quality of Leninism presupposes a
clear understanding of the actual conditions of the political, in contrast to the anemia of
liberal democracy, which he claims obscures the real basis of politics and produce policy
haphazardly, distrusting the power of decision which it had wrested from the monarchies
of Europe.34 For Schmitt, the enemy is not a personal foe but rather a public enemy, a
collection of people recognized by another collection as a potential foe within a life-ordeath struggle. The enemy need not be hated, since its concrete existence is one of an
undifferentiated mass, but he insists that the enemy is fundamentally a stranger.35
For Schmitt, Lenin’s political clarity can be seen in his assertion that “persons
who think of politics as small tricks which at times border on deceit must be decisively
refuted. Classes cannot be deceived”36 However, Schmitt recognizes the futility of an
internationalist politics premised upon the enemy: a world-state, he argues would cease to
be a political entity the moment it could no longer identify an enemy.37 He accepts the
possibility that all of humanity could be divided between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, and in this scenario claims the class war would demonstrate the total nature
of politics by politicizing previously apolitical concepts and social spheres, but he
roundly rejects the idea that such a struggle would culminate in the end of politics. If the

34

Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of The Political, pp. 70-71.

35

Ibid, pp. 27, 28, 32.

36

Ibid, p. 63.

37

Ibid, p. 57.

64

class division was no longer capable of determining the friend-enemy relationship, it
would cease to be political.38
Such an observation reveals the limits of Lenin’s political project by exposing its
dependency upon the concept of the “enemy” to produce its content. This problem, along
with the wider implications of Lenin’s uncomfortable proximity to Schmitt’s
conservative statism, shall be addressed more fully in the final chapter. For now,
however, let it suffice that Lenin’s approach to emancipating the working classes remains
within the horizons of Schmitt’s conception of the state: protego ergo obligo39 The
assumption of political power by the working class implies, for Lenin, a submission to
the discipline of a revolutionary party against a clearly identified third-person enemy, one
which may exist outside the class or within its very ranks. Under the tutelage of the
vanguard, the workers are to approach the seat of authority “gaily, when invited, beating
obedient to controlling hands.”40
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Chapter 4: Lawmaking, Friendship, and the Problem of the Exception
As the conclusion of this study approaches, now would be an apt time to
reconsider a suggestion made in the introduction that both Mohandas Gandhi and
Vladimir Lenin can be read through the lens of revolutionary utopianism. Such a reading
would no doubt prove galling to either thinker, who each takes great pains to distinguish
his own project from contemporary utopian ideals, distinctions which are certainly
justified. The specific sense of utopianism which I suggest fits both of these projects,
however, is the one presented by Walter Benjamin (1996) in his Critique of Violence, a
sense of utopia which discloses the intimate relationship between law and politics. In
considering how the interaction between the law and the revolutionary agenda plays out
for both thinkers, the problematic relationship between friendship and politics comes into
clearer focus.
This problem can be configured as the problem of the exception; like familial
relations, friendship presents a relationship which is exceptional with respect to the status
quo, albeit one which does not reduce to a “natural” law of filiation. Whereas exceptions
made for family members can be partially reconciled to, or at least comprehended by the
law as the manifestations of a rival law of familial affection, friendship provides no such
escape hatch: friends, unlike biological family members, are chosen, and the idea of a
friendship guaranteed by law fails to escape contradiction. If friends must rely upon the
possibility of courts or contracts to vouchsafe their relationship, then the relationship of
friendship is voided.
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As a manifestation of exceptional circumstances, friendship constitutes a limit to
the law’s reach because the law, if it is to remain the law, must be applied
indiscriminately. However, another theorist of the exception, Carl Schmitt (1996), places
the figure of the enemy into the space of the exception and conceives of politics as the
possibility of neutralizing the exception. Within Schmitt’s framework, friendship is
transferred from the realm of the exception into the sphere of everyday affairs, and as a
politically relevant relationship, friendship becomes practically synonymous with
citizenship. Although Schmitt maintains that he is discussing public, rather than private
relationships,1 a move which ostensibly leaves open the potential for friendship outside
the possibility of warfare, these nonpolitical friendships, if they exist, are both impotent
and vulnerable with respect to politics. For example, an American citizen could be
friends with several Iranian citizens while simultaneously despising some people who
happen to also be American citizens. However, if a war were to break out between the
United States and Iran, this American would find himself implicitly locked within a lifeor-death struggle with his “friends,” while those he had despised would become his allies.
Within the limit-experience of organized armed combat, private, spontaneous
friendship becomes subsumed beneath a “friendship” of law, and insofar as this
possibility (of warfare between states) remains ever-present in politics, friendships
outside the scope of warfare appear to be nothing more than a superficial glaze which
must be suspended when political reality manifests itself. Such, at least, are the
implications of a politics in which friendship is appropriated as a cipher for the order of
1
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law and in which the exception to law is greeted as hostility to law, as a hostile
relationship. Instead of seeing in the exception a limitation of the law’s ability to regulate
sociality, Schmitt conceives of the exception as the extralegal force of law itself. The
decision which identifies the enemy cannot itself be subject to law because it is the
precondition of all law, the line which marks the space of illegality and transgression as
such.2
However, as Tracy Strong (1996) suggests, Schmitt’s concept of friendship
remains undertheorized and dependent upon the concept of the enemy to determine its
content.3 The challenge to the law posed by the exception is evaded, rather than
confronted, by Schmitt’s decision to privilege enmity over friendship with respect to the
exception, a decision which undercuts the possibility of dissension by removing it from
the “pure” concept of the political, which instead demands solidarity in the face of the
relentless threat of war. As we shall see, Schmitt’s neutralization of the exception
succeeds only by reducing the exception to a component part of a total(itarian) system,
producing a situation in which friendship is little more than homogeneity before the law
and in which the enemy appears as a visage of the law itself seen through a glass, darkly.
At the point of promulgating new foundations for law, both Gandhi and Lenin
must each confront the problem of the exception, and their strategies for negotiating these
exceptions mark a pernicious compromise within their revolutionary discourses,
2
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demarcating the place where their challenge to one form of law becomes co-opted by the
demands of another. The concept of friendship exposes this reversal, and the limitations
which each thinker imposes upon friendship function as a neutralization of the exception,
despite the fact that such exceptions open the possibility of the very critique of law
implicit within both projects. In the famous dictum that revolutions devour their children
can be appropriated as an unintentional condemnation of the lingering metaphysics of law
(and corresponding hostility towards dissent) within certain revolutionary discourses, as
opposed to its typical deployment as a conservative retreat into the arms of tradition.
The first section below will explore the concept of law-making violence and its
relationship to utopian politics within Walter Benjamin’s (1996) Critique of Violence,
using these insights to clarify the relationship between revolution and law for both
Gandhi and Lenin, as well as to identify the utopian elements within both projects. The
second section shall move to the problem of the exception and its neutralization by
Schmitt (1996). This will provide a basis to critique the neutralizations which Gandhi
achieves through a discourse of tolerance and which Lenin accomplishes through the
concept of class consciousness.
The conclusion shall tentatively suggest that rather than being systematized within
a self-consistent legal totality, the exception must be confronted as an interruption of the
smooth legal machinery of politics. I will argue that such an encounter places
responsibility outside of the domain of law and that we are responsible to the other only
insofar as our responses are not mere repetitions of an anonymous legal schema. Such an
approach implies the incommensurability between friendship and law, yet this
incommensurability need not be a source of political stagnation, nor need it result in a
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depoliticization of friendship. Instead, this irreducible division indicates the possibility of
a politics capable of confronting the inherent violence of law without naively searching
for a “higher” law which can comprehensively diffuse all possible dissension.
Lawmaking Violence and Utopia
Meditating upon the relationship between law and violence, Walter Benjamin
(1996) argues that the foundations of law are constituted by “mythic” violence. Such
violence does not punish offenders so much as it makes examples out of the unwitting to
establish the boundaries of acceptability. Drawing from examples of Greek mythology,
Benjamin notes that the tragic hero’s arrogance brings about ruin, not because it violates
any law, but because it challenges fate.4 This relationship between law and fate proves
crucial for Benjamin’s analysis.
Law-preserving violence, the power of policing society and enforcing established
law, achieves its formidable guise and pervasive presence insofar as it resembles fate.
Such violence does not operate as a deterrent, he argues, because deterrence implies a
certainty of response which is contradicted by the possibility of escaping detection.
Instead, this very uncertainty augments the threat posed by the police, who become
garbed in the semblance of fate, a force which can be eluded indefinitely but which
engenders perpetual anxiety and watchfulness.5 This fatal quality of the law manifests
itself more clearly still, however, in the critique of lawmaking violence.
Whereas law-preserving violence is directed towards legal ends, i.e. the
enforcement of pre-existing law, lawmaking violence consummates a form of power and
4
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expresses its indomitable presence, leading Benjamin to conclude that “Lawmaking is
powermaking, assumption of power, and to that extent an immediate manifestation of
violence.”6 In contrast to the ominous specter of the police, lawmaking violence achieves
its highest ends in capital punishment, the purpose of which is not to punish an offender
but to re-affirm the law as a whole by establishing a new law in the particular instance.7
Every officious death at the hands of the state stands as a testament to the power which
its words command, demonstrating its ability to annihilate rival claimants. Although the
execution of a murderer may be conveyed as a moral response to the horror of his crime,
his violence invites the wrath of the state, not because of its impact upon the victim, but
because he has dared to usurp the state’s power over life and death, a power which has
often been employed against crimes of far milder scope. However, every exercise of this
power betrays an ineffaceable anxiety within lawmaking violence.
In his Reflections on the Guillotine, Albert Camus (1961) dismisses numerous
arguments in favor of capital punishment by noting that these arguments delicately
circumvent the abject horror of the practices they defend. In place of euphemisms about
the condemned “paying his debt to society,” he asks why the beheadings are not
recounted in gory, excruciating detail if their purpose is actually to deter future crime.
Observing how the proceedings of capital punishment were kept safely behind prison
walls in twentieth century France, Camus suggests that the state’s failure to kill publicly
betrays doubts about the validity of its authority to kill.8 Benjamin (1996) perceives a
6

Ibid, p. 248.

7

Ibid, p. 242.

8

Camus, Albert. Resistance, Rebellion, and Death, pp. 138, 142.

71

similar crisis of legitimacy within parliamentary systems which “lack the sense that they
represent a lawmaking violence,” and which therefore fail to govern effectively because
they have lost or forgotten the basis of their rule.9 The extent to which a state fears the
emergence of rival powers and finds its hegemony to be insecure, Benjamin argues, will
be the extent to which it clings ever-jealously to its formal monopoly of violence, not for
the preservation of its ends (the social goals which it sets itself) but for the preservation
of itself.10
That every lawmaking violence feels itself to be the last manifestation of such
violence becomes apparent within the struggle between revolutionary violence and state
violence. Both Gandhi and Lenin appear to recognize the distinctive quality of a struggle
in which the state itself is a partisan. Writing during the heat of the Indian National
Congress’ struggle against the British imperial government, Gandhi (1972) argues that
India cannot accept gifts from the British with one hand while accepting blows with
another. Instead, he insists that “association with the Government is a crime,” calling
instead for a complete disengagement from British rule and indifference towards its
decisions.11 While such a position does not appear violent, Benjamin (1996) notes the
complex relationship between even non-action and violence, claiming that any move
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which extorts concessions from others must be considered violent, although a pure
“severing of relations” can be nonviolent.12
Although Gandhi’s (1972) political vision strives for this latter option, the reality
of British rule rendered such action impossible, leading Gandhi to extol the virtues of
courageous opposition to the government. He acknowledges that words without power
will be useless against the government, and instead promotes courageous noncooperation above courageous violence on the grounds that only the former can establish
the law which India will need after independence.13 Seizing upon the anxieties which
characterize lawmaking power under assault, Gandhi argues that “terrorism and
deception are weapons not of the strong but of the weak,” aligning his own politics with
the fearless display of public power which constitutes a healthy lawmaking violence, a
power formidable enough to leave its most dangerous weapons untouched.14
In this respect, Gandhian forbearance resembles Nietzsche’s (1968) definition of
mercy as the self-overcoming of justice. Nietzsche argues that the measure of strength for
a community is its ability to ignore transgressions against itself, claiming that “It is not
unthinkable that a society might obtain such a consciousness of power that it could allow
itself the noblest luxury possible to it-letting those who harm it go unpunished.”15 Gandhi
(1972a) echoes this very construction in his elaboration of the “law of love,” arguing that
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“forgiveness is more manly than punishment…but abstinence is forgiveness only when
there is power to punish.”16 He goes on to define this law as a harmony between duty and
inclination, a “reckless” generosity, and the “natural” law of the human species.17 In Hind
Swaraj Gandhi (1997) even makes the case that the content of his political vision
precedes British rule as a primordial constitution of Indian society which abjured law
courts, luxury, and ephemeral shows of force in favor of an ethic of restraint and selfmastery.18 Here, as elsewhere, Gandhi commingles his dissension from British law with a
counterforce of “natural” law which temporally frames the usurpations of violence by
both preceding these injustices as well as by bringing them to a close.
Like Lenin, Gandhi (1972) understands the revolution to be an imminent struggle
against the state, rather than a future state of affairs. Writing in 1921, he claims that
Swaraj would be achievable within a single day if the masses were capable of exercising
the necessary self-discipline. However, these people, whom Gandhi claims to understand
better than any other educated Indian, are not ready to fully utilize the tools which are
already at their disposal, and he insists that complete non-cooperation, at the present
moment, would simply unleash their wrath against the wealthy, thereby undercutting the
only sound basis for overthrowing British rule.19 Momentarily setting aside the flagrantly
chauvinistic paternalism embedded within these statements, they illustrate an approach to
revolutionary practice common to both Gandhi and Lenin, an approach that understands
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revolutionary struggle to be a battle for lawmaking power in which those who must
adhere to the law are themselves the battleground.
On such a basis, Lenin (1975) condemns both Legal Marxism and terrorism as
being equally utopian. In this context, Legal Marxism indicates a range of positions
which sought to legislatively advance the interests of Russia’s fragile capitalist classes in
order to prepare for a proletarian revolution once Russia had become an advanced
capitalist society, while terrorism refers to use of spontaneous violence to unsettle the
social order. In Lenin’s view, both positions falter due to a dogmatic adherence to
spontaneity. Legal Marxism, he argues, fetishes the spontaneity of the labor movement,
naively assuming that the capitalist laws which organize the struggle for better wages and
working conditions will simply evolve into socialism once the working class has
sufficiently advanced.20 Terrorism, by contrast, raises individual passion to the level of a
political program and replaces organization with isolated, disruptive violence played out
in futile pitched battles with the state.21
As Georg Lukács (1971b) observes, neither of these positions actually confronts
the state as an object of the revolutionary agenda; the Legal Marxists simply assume it to
be a passive effect of social forces which shall mutate alongside the maturation of the
labor movement, whereas the terrorists simply attempt to disrupt its underlying social
forces by battling its police powers.22 By contrast, Lenin’s (1975) critique of spontaneity
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can be conceived as a promotion of lawmaking violence. He argues that spontaneity is
synonymous with the path of least resistance, and that within a capitalist society, all
spontaneous action on the part of the labor movement will produce little more than a
policy of trade unionism in which all gains by the workers are inextricably bound to the
power of the bourgeois state.23
Similarly, Benjamin (1996) dismisses political strikes on the grounds that they
merely produce external modifications of labor conditions while deploying extortionist
violence. He contrasts this form of violence with the “lawbreaking” violence of the
general strike, claiming that while the former, by extorting resources from employers,
perpetuates the violence of the state while transferring power “from the privileged to the
privileged,” the latter inaugurates a “wholly transformed work, no longer enforced by the
state.”24 Within Lenin’s (1975) thought, such a transformation can only come from
without; the role of the vanguard party, in this sense, is to compose a force external to the
state capable of striking its power down through the coordination of lawmaking violence.
He insists that for the proletariat to assume its legislative authority, it must be exposed to
the entire gamut of society, broadening its political competence beyond the sphere of the
factory.25 These exposures are themselves acts of lawmaking violence because they
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awaken a particular social class to its imminent power to decide social policy while
exposing the vulnerability of existing law.
Despite these similarities, however, a crucial difference between Benjamin and
Lenin exposes a utopian commitment within the thought of both Lenin and Gandhi.
Benjamin (1996) does not refer to the general strike as lawmaking, but instead as
anarchic. He dismisses lawmaking violence, which he had earlier associated with mythic
violence, as a utopian program which dreams that just ends and just means can be
reconciled unproblematically through law.26 Instead, he asks:
How would it be, therefore, if all the violence imposed by fate, using justified
means, were of itself in irreconcilable conflict with just ends, and if at the same
time a different kind of violence arose that certainly could be either the justified
or the unjustified means to those ends but was not related to them as means at all
but in some different way? 27
Benjamin suggests that such a position can help to illuminate the intractable problem of
the law, which rests in the fact that the law is constituted by an act of violence which
claims to offer redress for violence. Nonviolent solutions to conflict are possible,
Benjamin assures us, albeit only through direct interpersonal relationships unalloyed by
the law’s violence, resting instead upon conditions of “courtesy, sympathy,
peaceableness, trust,” and other forms of intersubjective disposition which comprise,
among others, relations of friendship.28
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In opposition to mythic violence, which perpetuates the law, Benjamin presents
“divine” violence as “lawbreaking” violence.29 This is the form of violence which relates
to the ends of justice in a manner other than means which Benjamin mentions above, and
it cannot be studied with certainty because its manifestation marks a moment of
irreducible exceptionality. Lawbreaking violence is not directed towards the destruction
of an enemy but instead resembles the “educative power,” insofar as it strikes without
bloodshed, annihilating an established law to open a future of possibility.30
Although this concept of divine violence is surely seductive, it must be recalled
that this is an unconscious form of violence, unknown to itself until after the fact, which
Benjamin likens to “the crowd’s divine judgment on the criminal.”31 He uses the Old
Testament commandment “Thou shalt not kill,” to illustrate the dynamics of this
violence, arguing that this commandment is not a standard of judgment but instead a
guideline for action which intercepts the act of killing before it is even conceived.
However, because the commandment takes the form of an existential injunction, rather
than a standard for punishment, once it is transgressed, as in cases of self-defense, the
commandment itself becomes incommensurable with the deed.32 In a feverish moment of
mortal danger, an individual or a community must decide whether a state of exception
has occurred and becomes absolutely responsible for the outcome, despite all uncertainty.
29
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Torn away from the anonymous guidelines of ordinary life, the moment of decision in the
time of exception constitutes a fearsome, irrevocable instance of self-expression, the
thought of which can make even stoutest heart tremble and quiver.
The Exception and Its Neutralizations
In Benjamin’s thought, the exception to law provides a space both for politically
active friendship as well as for the orgiastic awe of lawbreaking violence. However, this
recognition of the law’s limitations is predicated upon a critique of the law’s economy of
violence which renders utopian any attempt to found a revolutionary project upon the
promise of new law. Carl Schmitt (1996) shares Benjamin’s association between
responsibility and the exception, but Schmitt’s interpretation of this responsibility
comprises an existential call to arms echoing from the deepest reaches of the law itself.
Tracy Strong has argued that, despite Schmitt’s dismissal of ethical universalism, he
remains committed to the problem of life’s inherent meaningfulness, and to this end, he
posits the life-or-death struggle as a moment of world disclosure in which the veil of
pretense is stripped away and the subject is left to account for itself before the abyssal
stare of death.33
For Schmitt, the exception must never be a cause for dissent, but rather must be
an occasion for dispensing with petty personal differences to fight an adversary who
threatens the life of the community. If any element within the state can prevent the state
from declaring war without itself assuming this role of declaring public enemies, Schmitt
argues that this state has ceased to be a political entity and that another state shall
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perforce assume this decisive position.34 Whereas Max Weber (1999) argued that the
state maintains a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory,”35 Schmitt (1996) modifies this formula by insisting that the state bears a
monopoly of politics within a given territory, the difference being that political violence
first requires a decision as to the identity of an enemy, a decision which rests solely with
the state.36
By monopolizing politics within a territory, the state creates the normal situation
of total peace, necessary for the ordinary functioning of law. Although the state’s power
of decision pervades society even in times of peace, declaring criminals to be public
enemies and deploying its techniques of violence to quash these meager wars, the
community is produced as an indivisible whole under the law by this peace. However,
Benjamin (1996) has identified an insidious undercurrent which accompanies such
ceremonial peace. The frontiers which are established by such peace crystallize the
domination of the vanquished whose rights become like iron chains wreathed in the
demonic glow of legitimacy. “For both parties to the treaty,” he writes, “it is the same
line that may not be crossed,” a point he garnishes with Anatole France’s quip that “poor
and rich are equally forbidden to spend the night under bridges.”37 However, this
depoliticization of peace serves to demonstrate an irresolvable crisis within Schmitt’s
34
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thought which carries profound implications for both Gandhi and Lenin, as well as for the
concept of friendship.
Given Schmitt’s (1996) double requirements of total peace and bellicose
autonomy for the state, he unwittingly follows the liberal theorists whom he criticizes for
believing that the state “should be able to do everything, yet allowed to do nothing.”38
Schmitt insists that the enemy must be a collectivity of humans with similar capacities to
the state, and that the enemy relationship presupposes the ability of each to annihilate the
other. However, Schmitt also maintains that states can never exist singularly, but that
they presuppose a plurality of similar entities with which war may occur.39 Indeed, this
last point is crucial to Schmitt’s critique of political pacifism, a position he exposes as
contradictory. If the possibility of warfare terminates, then so too do the politics of
opposing war, given that the impetus of life-or-death struggle which drives politics would
no longer exist to organize or enforce such a politics.40 However, the combination of
these premises-similar collectivities, the possibility of annihilation, and the impossibility
of a singular state-prove contradictory.
Far from accepting the possibility of the enemy’s annihilation, Schmitt’s politics,
as Benjamin’s (1996) analysis of peace had aptly predicted, requires an enemy from
across the borders of legality and territory to make peace with. It appears that Schmitt’s
(1996) insightful and incisive eviscerations of liberalism are prompted in part by a fear of
losing the enemy, and with him, the possibility of high politics. He aptly critiques
38
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liberalism’s effacement of the possibility of warfare, noting that the liberal state is torn
between two contradictory goals: that of preserving its citizens’ property and liberty
versus the war-making requirements incumbent upon all states. Far from trivializing the
possibility of mass slaughter, Schmitt solemnly emphasizes the severity of this
possibility, asking what humans can possibly be asked to kill and die for en masse,
concluding that the egoistic enjoyments of bourgeois society are an inadequate basis for
such sacrifice.41
It appears that in striking the root of liberal depoliticization, Schmitt is motivated
by a still-deeper anxiety towards politics. Unlike his liberal foils, this would not be an
anxiety of death in battle, but a fear that such death may become meaningless without the
clear divisions between public enemies. If the enemy is truly annihilated, the political
community finds itself without any partners across the table with which to engage in the
ceremony of peacemaking, breaking down the boundaries between war and peace and
rendering the danger of civil strife inevitable. This is particularly worrisome for Schmitt
because he maintains that a civil war is not a political event in the purest sense of the
term, constituting instead a self-laceration within the community.42 Given the privileged
status of hostility within Schmitt’s thought, all internal dissension must appear to carry
the dangerous auspices of just such self-lacerations, and without the menacing presence
of the stranger across the border, through whom the community can recognize itself as a
potential participant in combat, Schmitt’s political logic cannot help but to tear the
community asunder.
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Even wearing the mask of the enemy, the exceptional nature of friendship
manages to shake the political to its core. Schmitt’s thought succeeds in removing
friendship from the space of the exception and substituting it with the enemy, but in
doing so, enmity becomes the singular, albeit madly unstable, form of social cohesion,
rendering any thought of sociality outside of the violence of law impossible. By
reconfiguring the exception’s challenge to law as a relationship of warfare which
inaugurates the law, Schmitt’s thought remains utterly dependent upon the enemy
concept for its own self-understanding, by turns destroying and being destroyed by the
exception. A similar limitation inhabits the thought both Gandhi and Lenin, who each
deploy strategies of neutralization at the expense of a troubled, anemic conception of
friendship.
For Gandhi (1972), the problem of the exception is voided by a discourse of
tolerance combined with practices of ascetic discipline. Together, these features form the
ideal, autonomous Gandhian subject. Tolerance reconciles the tension between Gandhi’s
commitment to nonviolence and his project of revolutionary struggle by depoliticizing
antipathy towards persons and directing it instead towards institutions. Appearing in court
for the circulation of seditious articles, Gandhi uses the time allocated for his defense to
declare himself an enemy of the court. Rather than attempting to justify himself
according to British imperial law, he suggests that this law is a source of criminality and
that his judge, as an honorable man, must either resign from the court or impose upon
him the maximum sentence.43 Here, Gandhi deploys the discourse of tolerance indicated
in the second chapter by polemically undermining the legitimacy of the imperial legal
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apparatus while maintaining a pretext of civility; furthermore, his critical; stance against
the court is informed by a sense that its presence is solely attributable to the tolerance of
those under its jurisdiction. In this instance, Gandhi’s use of tolerance to force a decision
upon the court proves admirable as a weapon against colonial hegemony, but it also
demonstrates the manner in which this tolerance can mask relationships of coercion.
Although Gandhi inventively uses the language of tolerance to assail the power of
the British authorities, this usage becomes more problematic when applied to his social
inferiors. In his writings for Young India Gandhi (1927) juxtaposes his own acceptance of
India’s Untouchables with demands that the Untouchable community remain patient and
forego the threat of violence. Although he does not here explicitly use the language of
tolerance, its importance within his writings for regulating the unity of India’s disparate
ethnic and religious groups opens his approach towards Untouchability to a similar
reading, particularly because the Untouchable caste constitutes a marginalized group
within Indian society and, hence, a conventional object for tolerance. He positions
himself as a pariah among pariahs to disarm the exceptional plight of the Untouchables
and suggests that the Untouchables will be accepted if only they remain tolerant of other
Hindus’ prejudice and return good will for ill.44
Within Gandhi’s (1972) political program, tolerance and asceticism are linked as
practices of an autonomous will which can resist the temptation to make exceptions to the
law of non-violent resistance. He presents the relationship between the British rulers and
their Indian subjects as one of mutual dependence which must be broken if swaraj is to be
achieved. To this end, Gandhi’s advocacy of handicrafts and austere living as techniques
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of resistance appear to move towards a nonviolent, noncoercive disengagement from the
British,45 yet his social program makes enormous demands upon the lives of its
practicioners which lose their significance outside of the anticolonial struggle. For
instance, Gandhi repeatedly urges students enrolled in universities to drop out and move
to the countryside in solidarity with the nationalist struggle, effacing the productive
potential of education in the name of a rigorous program which can broach no
exception.46
For his part, Lenin (1975) finds his source of law within the dialectical theory of
history in the form of proletarian class consciousness. Such a principle enables Lenin to
compromise in practice without compromising in principle, and against Social Democrats
who opposed alliances with the bourgeoisie during the Czarist regime, Lenin retorts:
“Only those who are unsure of themselves can fear to enter into temporary alliances, even
with unreliable people; not a single party could exist without such alliances.”47 Such an
approach enables compromises while diffusing the possibility of exceptions, since
erstwhile allies outside of the proletarian class could wither be liquidated or assimilated
at an opportune time.
However, the hostility of Lenin’s revolutionary discourse to a plurality of voices
can be glimpsed within his exchanges with Clara Zetkin (1975). Zetkin had recently
established a communist newspaper in Hamburg for prostitutes, and while Lenin
45

Gandhi, Mohandas. Gandhi, Mohandas. Swaraj in One Year, pp. 36-38.

46

Ibid, pp. 50-53.

47

Lenin, Vladimir. What Is to Be Done? In The Lenin Anthology, ed. Robert
Tucker, p. 17.

85

appeared amused by the idea and sympathetic to the plight of prostitutes insofar as they
were victims of bourgeois hypocrisy and avarice, he dismissed the idea of a newspaper
specifically for prostitutes on the grounds that it was politically trivial, an embarrassment
to the party, and a subject which would solve itself with the onset of the revolution.48
On its own, this example may have little bearing towards Lenin’s overall project,
but this is precisely the point. The fact that prostitution does not neatly fit Lenin’s
worldview does not interrupt his political vision, but is instead subordinated to a struggle
which he considers more substantial and worthy of attention, namely, the revolution of
the working class. Furthermore, his exchange with Zetkin reveals a surprising similarity
with Gandhi; like the Mahatma, Lenin embraces female political agency provided that it
does not challenge the totality of a political vision with the demands of an irreducible
female sexuality. Just as Lenin’s politics of the party subjugated friendship to the
demands of class consciousness, so too does his reaction to the political agency of
German prostitutes illustrate a politics still bound to the safety of a clear, moral
battlefield.
Conclusion
Although this study began by questioning whether either figure had successfully
integrated friendship into politics, it now appears that friendship offers a point at which
both projects fold back into the system of law against which they were mobilized.
Whether through the mediations of Divine Truth or Class Consciousness, both thinkers
oppose oppressive totalities with other, ostensibly “higher” totalities which remain
incapable of thinking politics outside the bounds of an objective, self-consistent code of
48
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laws. Friendship, meanwhile, confronts politics under the guise of the exception to
present a possibility for political thought which does not end at the establishment of law.
In this respect, friendship’s relevance to politics would come as an interruption, a
suggestion that not all forms of life are commensurable with law, challenging arbitrary
attachments to the form of the law where it need not apply. Alternatively, political
critique can expose and undermine the pernicious possibilities within friendship,
possibilities which can include callousness towards the public in the name of preference
for a few. Of course, such a friendship, closed against the world, the “perfect” classical
friendship, in other words, would merely represent the effort to found a friendship which
was a law unto itself. Against such security within friendship, and in mind of the
possibilities for subterfuge, betrayal, and loss which haunt every step which friends may
take together, the politics of friendship can only promise “the awful daring of a moment’s
surrender, which an age of prudence can never retract.”49
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